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This thesis focuses on the role foreign policy played in legitimizing the early French Fifth 
Republic from 1958 to 1960. I argue that President Charles de Gaulle employed foreign policy in 
the service of gaining public support for his new government and the new republic. Many 
historians have argued previously that his foreign policy of grandeur, as it came to be called, was 
used to recast international politics and France‟s role in them. My work diverges from these 
previous interpretations by arguing that Gaullist foreign policy served, in many instances, 
overarching domestic goals, not French international interests. I see foreign policy as inseparable 
from the broader domestic ambition to craft a persuasive narrative of renewal and national unity 
under Gaullist stewardship. In the process, my study puts de Gaulle‟s foreign policy into the 
context of his larger aspiration to precipitate constitutional reform and, thereafter, ensure popular 
support. De Gaulle exploited opportunities to use foreign policy in order to shape public opinion, 
both domestically and internationally. These efforts, as my research reflects, helped foster public 
support for the new regime and, by portraying national renewal, further discredited the preceding 
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 In May 1958, the leading politicians of the French nation, burdened by years of colonial 
conflict and a public clamoring for resolution, turned to the wartime hero, Charles de Gaulle, 
with hopes of securing a solution palatable to the many seemingly irreconcilable factions of 
French society.  Upon his official return, de Gaulle, joined by his loyalist of companions, set out 
to end the short-lived Fourth Republic. Broad swathes of a weary public proved ready to forsake 
the postwar republic in exchange for de Gaulle‟s ambiguous promise to settle the ongoing 
Algerian War.  By late summer 1958 a small group, headed by de Gaulle‟s closest advisor 
Michel Debré, completed the draft of a new constitution. On 28 September 1958, 80% of the 
public, vested in de Gaulle, approved of the constitution that became the foundation of the Fifth 
French Republic. Nearly three months later, on 21 December 1958, the electoral notables chose 
Charles de Gaulle as the first president of the Fifth Republic. On 8 January 1959, de Gaulle 
began his presidency.
1
 That day marked the beginning of, among many other things, an 
extravagant foreign policy which, for the next 10 years, often captivated France‟s domestic 
audience as much as it frustrated France‟s allies. De Gaulle‟s foreign policy of grandeur has 
since perplexed and fascinated the many historians who have analyzed its intentions and goals. 
 Since de Gaulle‟s presidency, countless historians and political scientists have penned 
works devoted to his diplomatic initiatives. Early works, like W.W. Kulski‟s De Gaulle and the 
World offered careful analyses of de Gaulle‟s initiatives but indubitably found themselves 
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wrapped up in the politics of the day.
2
  Others quickly followed. The common theme among 
them tended to rest on the idea that French foreign policy was “overtly striven to preserve and 
extend French influence abroad.”
3
 Herbert Tint‟s French Foreign Policy since the Second World 
War and John Newhouse‟s De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons provide prime examples of this 
trend.
4
 Shortly thereafter, Stanley Hoffman offered the first seminal text on de Gaulle‟s foreign 
policy, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s. Hoffman‟s work considered de Gaulle‟s 
diplomacy alongside, though separate from, his domestic role in French society.
5
 The work 
provided a valuable framework through which to see how de Gaulle‟s conceptions of grandeur 
and his political cunning played out in both the domestic context and the international arena.  
Other works from the period offered significant contributions to the field. Wilfrid Kohl‟s 
French Nuclear Diplomacy, for instance, placed the French pursuit of an independent nuclear 
force in the center of a larger, overarching diplomatic strategy which the nuclear program was 
not simply one part of, but central to.
6
 His work helped establish the importance of the nuclear 
force to France‟s political and diplomatic strategy.  Another work from the period, Michael M. 
Harrison‟s The Reluctant Ally, argued that “French security and alliance policies … ceas[ed] to 
be such divisive issues in domestic politics largely because of the gradual emergence of a 
national consensus on the value of the Gaullist security model.”
7
 Harrison‟s monograph offered 
an insightful analysis on the policy continuities between the Fourth and Fifth Republics, while 
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also identifying why Gaullist conceptions of independence – whether in nuclear capability or 
alliances – has since become the basis for French foreign policy.  
The early 1990s saw the emergence of a number of works that focused specifically on the 
relationship between the United States and France, as well as the tensions that arose as both 
countries tried to advance their own interests. Frank Costigliola‟s France and the United States, 
Charles G. Cogan‟s Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends, and the edited collection De Gaulle and the 
United States all represent this trend.
8
 The late 1990s saw the emergence of several major works 
by two French historians, both aided by extensive (and presumably previously unavailable) 
archival research. Maurice Vaïsse‟s La Grandeur placed, and rightly so, the Algerian War and 
decolonization elsewhere in Africa squarely within the broader context of Gaullist foreign 
policy, something the vast majority of diplomatic histories had previously neglected.
9
 The other, 
Frédéric Bozo‟s Two Strategies for Europe added to the conclusions advanced by Stanley 
Hoffman that saw de Gaulle‟s foreign policy as an all-encompassing “grand design” in which 
“power, independence, and grandeur were for de Gaulle inseparable from the much wider 
objective of transforming the international system.”
10
 
Through the course of the historiography, many historians have offered nuanced 
contributions that have, each in their own way, advanced our understanding of the complexities 
and considerations that surrounded French diplomacy in the age of de Gaulle.  Still, I will argue, 
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there exist more continuities than differences. Surely, the historiography has since shed subtle 
accusations of anti-Americanism found in earlier works such as Newhouse‟s De Gaulle and the 
Anglo-Saxons.  Yet, the interpretation presented by Stanley Hoffman in 1974 has since become 
the underlying foundation for all contributions that followed. As Hoffman noted, “…the purpose 
of [de Gaulle‟s] statecraft was never in doubt. He had an unalterable set of imperatives and a 
clear design. The imperative was to renew France‟s substance and power, to restore her influence 
abroad, and to have her play as independent and active a role on the world stage as the world and 
French resources allowed.”
11
 Indeed, this assertion, that de Gaulle designed French policy with 
the intent of restoring France‟s international standing, has reigned supreme.  
To illustrate this, we turn briefly to a contemporary rumination on the question at hand.  
In the conclusion to the 2010 edited collection, Globalizing de Gaulle, Garret Martin assessed 
the state of the debate. In it, he asked “What was [de Gaulle] trying to achieve with his often 
maverick foreign policy? Did he have a grand design, that is to say an overarching and ambitious 
vision to reshape international affairs, or was it mere posturing to further, and only further, 
France‟s prestige? This question divided commentators at the time, and still does today.”
12
  
This thesis seeks to diverge from the prevailing narrative that has hitherto dominated the 
interpretations of Gaullist foreign policy. In doing so, it rejects the notion that Gaullist foreign 
policy, at least in the early years of the Fifth Republic, sought to secure the return of France‟s 
“great power” standing or the restoration and spread of French international influence. Instead, it 
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argues that much of de Gaulle‟s major foreign policy decisions in the earliest years of his 
premiership, 1958-1960, were designed and executed with the intent of satisfying domestic 
goals. It argues that foreign policy served less to advance French interests on the international 
stage and more to act as an adjunct to Gaullist efforts to shape public opinion and garner popular 
support for the young Fifth Republic. Foreign policy, I argue, played a principal role in shaping 
the narrative of national unity central to the Gaullist republic.     
In these efforts, this thesis has several main goals. First, it seeks to place Gaullist 
domestic ambitions squarely within the context of an analysis of foreign policy. The diplomatic 
literature on de Gaulle has neglected the central (and overriding) importance with which he and 
his closest allies, including Michel Debré and André Malraux, regarded constitutional reform. 
The founding of the Fifth Republic, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, proved central to all other 
considerations in the early years of de Gaulle‟s tenure. Secondly, this thesis aims to blur the line 
where domestic policy ends and foreign policy begins. It posits that foreign policy does not occur 
in a vacuum, unaffected by domestic constraints, concerns, or goals. Instead, it can, and does, 
play a crucial role in the shaping of domestic politics. Lastly, the broader goal of this thesis is to 
force a reconsideration of the role of foreign policy in general and to encourage considerations 
into possible domestic motivations of diplomacy during future research.  
In reaching this alternative interpretation of Gaullist foreign policy, I must credit the 
works, outside the gamut of diplomatic literature, which influenced my understanding of the 
anxieties and priorities of the period. Two in particular, Richard Kuisel‟s Seducing the French: 
The Dilemma of Americanization and Kristin Ross‟s Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization 
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and the Reordering of French Culture helped contextualize the fundamental changes French 
society underwent in the period and how the Cold War and “Americanization,” as well as 
domestic transformations, shaped France.
13
 Additionally, other works, like Herman Lebovics‟s 
Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture, helped impress 
upon me the Gaullists‟ broader goals for the Fifth Republic and national unity.
14
 Inclusion of 
prominent cultural, social, and political historians, has allowed me to develop a more 
complicated and nuanced view of Gaullist ambitions and French society in the period concerned.  
Before proceeding further, however, I find it prudent to define the limits of this study. For 
one, the study is limited to the years between 1958 and 1960 for several reasons. The first reason 
is the narrowed scope of an undergraduate honors thesis imposes certain constraints. Secondly, 
this period witnessed the creation of the Fifth Republic and early Gaullist efforts to ensure its 
legitimacy. Also, the study confines itself to an analysis of Gaullist foreign policy within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Atlantic Alliance. More specifically, the study 
focuses solely on France‟s interaction with the United States and United Kingdom within the 
alliance. In doing so, other NATO members – the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the 
Benelux countries, for instance – are neglected. Additionally, the reader will notice the Algerian 
War and the French pursuit of an independent nuclear force – both undoubtedly central to French 
history of the period – are (regrettably) treated as tangential factors to the story. The politics of 
European integration are avoided completely. The reasoning is twofold. Again, the capacities of 
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an undergraduate thesis prevent a larger role for the above topics. But also, and more 
importantly, it is the interactions with the Anglo-Americans in the context of NATO which best 
illustrate my argument.   
This delineation brings me to another limitation of the study that the reader will 
undoubtedly consider, if not outright challenge. In arguing that the reader must reconsider the 
intent of Gaullist foreign policy, I do not imply all foreign policy decisions. Naturally, most of 
the foreign policy formulations during the de Gaulle presidency strictly served France‟s interests 
in the international arena and did not seek to shape (at least overtly) French domestic opinion. 
Negotiations over European integration, for instance, or de Gaulle‟s efforts to court nations in 
South America and Africa served France‟s economic and strategic interests.  
There were two distinct types of diplomacy employed. There was the day-to-day efforts 
of diplomats like Ambassador Hervé Alphand and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, 
as well as other members of de Gaulle‟s cabinet who, at the President‟s request, went on foreign 
excursions meant to advance France‟s interests abroad. These functions are quite typical of all 
nations, in all time periods, within the diplomatic sphere. Then there was the other side of French 
diplomacy: the decisions and actions taken by de Gaulle himself. These moves, undertaken with 
an outward appearance of unilateralism, tended towards abruptness and generally privileged 
theatrical flair over negotiation or compromise. He announced decisions with an air of 
spontaneity – undoubtedly with the intent of attracting media attention – not after long, tiresome 
negotiations. Unilateral foreign policy decisions provided, as Stanley Hoffman suggested, “the 
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confrontations and the solo performances de Gaulle seemed to crave” in his efforts to project a 
presidential authority.
15
 It is these latter aspects of French diplomacy that concern us here.    
As this thesis will demonstrate, a large portion of French diplomatic decisions did prove 
superficial, especially in the context of the NATO alliance. In this respect, this thesis challenges 
the prevailing narrative that de Gaulle‟s orchestrations within the alliance served only to 
strengthen France‟s international standing and influence within (and eventually in contrast to) 
NATO. Contrary to the narrative which has interpreted the selected foreign policy decisions as 
part of a “grand design” to hasten an end to the bi-polar Cold War while enhancing French 
influence in the process, this study will demonstrate that the major policy decisions in relation to 
NATO in 1958-1959 – the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO 
integration and the removal of NATO nuclear stock piles from French soil – had no real intention 
of strengthening France‟s bid for international influence or leadership, but instead augmented the 
Gaullist domestic narrative of renewal under the Fifth Republic. Equally, this thesis seeks to 
place renewed importance on the aforementioned decisions, as well as de Gaulle‟s state visits of 
1960, which the diplomatic historiography has commonly seen as mere stepping stones, 
restricted by the larger demands of the ongoing Algerian War, towards the full-on foreign policy 
of grandeur which blossomed following the war‟s end in 1962.  
The thesis is therefore organized as follows. Chapter One is used to establish the 
domestic priorities facing the Gaullists in 1958 and thereafter. It analyzes the politics that 
surrounded the founding of the Fifth Republic and the efforts to establish the preeminence of 
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constitutional reform. This chapter challenges, if subtly, the assertions found in the diplomatic 
histories on the topic which suggest that de Gaulle‟s foremost concern upon his return to power 
was reviving French influence and prestige in the world. As Michel Debré, de Gaulle‟s closest 
advisor and first Prime Minister, reminded us, “despite pressing economic and financial 
problems, despite the difficulty of the Algerian problem, General de Gaulle made it his first 
priority to draft a new constitution.”
16
 Indeed, everything else – the Algerian War, France‟s 
global standing, the French economy and society – depended on this “all-important” task.
17
 This 
rationale came from the belief that, in order to execute all other endeavors successfully, France 
needed a governmental framework that ensured a stable and effective state.    
The chapter begins by examining de Gaulle‟s postwar foray into politics, joined by like-
minded compatriots, in an effort to illustrate the extent to which de Gaulle and his allies strove to 
shape the French political and governmental system. The final section of the chapter will address 
the period surrounding the formation of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle‟s return from political 
exile. This section will serve to demonstrate how various Gaullists took advantage of the 
increasing crisis in Algeria to precipitate an end to the Fourth Republic and, in doing so, usher in 
the Fifth Republic. Additionally, during this period of constitutional reform, we see a significant 
effort by de Gaulle and others to discredit the Fourth Republic and emphasize the 
indispensability of the new Fifth Republic institutions to the well-being of France. Their efforts, 
as we shall see, culminated in the construction of a narrative which asserted that France had 
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undergone a genuine – and necessary – transformation which promised national unity and 
renewal under the auspices of de Gaulle.   
Chapter Two considers France‟s position in the Cold War and how the Gaullists 
exploited this position to ensure the greatest domestic response. As Chapter One explained, 
constitutional reform proved the central factor to Gaullist efforts of the late 1950s. In this regard, 
the second chapter picks ups where the first leaves off. The second chapter seeks to demonstrate 
how the architects of the Fifth Republic sought to legitimize their new republic and its 
institutional changes – a strong, independent president juxtaposed against a parliament weaker 
than the French Republic had ever known – through foreign policy. The Gaullists believed that if 
they could craft a compelling message of renewal and rejuvenation, evidenced by tangible acts 
and policies, they could garner widespread and genuine support for the new regime, thus 
vindicating the constitutional reforms of 1958. This process relied on efforts to portray a marked 
change from the vilified Fourth Republic (which in Gaullist mythology reinforced a divisive and 
polarized French society) to the Fifth Republic which served to unite the country around the 
monarchical and paternal figure of Charles de Gaulle.  
This is where foreign policy becomes relevant to their efforts. How better to portray a 
major transformation in French politics than by acting out a highly visible, if not highly 
effectual, foreign policy buttressed by the inviting message of grandeur? This chapter serves also 
to challenge the prevailing narrative that de Gaulle‟s actions against the de facto Anglo-
American leadership during the period – the 1958 September Memorandum on the Directory and 
the 1959 decisions on the French Mediterranean Fleet and NATO nuclear stockpiles – 
11 
 
demonstrate his bid to increase France‟s leadership in the Western bloc of the Cold War. Instead, 
as the chapter will reflect, de Gaulle‟s policies against NATO in the early years of his presidency 
were a response to ambivalence felt throughout the French public about France‟s position in the 
Cold War bloc system. The chapter helps to place into context French attitudes about the Cold 
War and to remind us that de Gaulle‟s actions corresponded less to the confining Cold War 
paradigm and more to domestic socio-economic anxieties.  
Chapter Three provides examinations of the relevant policy decisions carried out during 
1959-1960, the first two years of de Gaulle‟s presidency. The chapter hinges on the 
understanding, which is reflected in the evidence, that the decisions did little, if anything, to alter 
France‟s international standing or French or NATO strategic considerations. Instead, the 
decisions served primarily to advance the Gaullist domestic narrative of both renewal and of a 
French state responding to the concerns of the French people. As the evidence will suggest, the 
Gaullist politics of independence in 1959 – the decisions to withdraw the French Mediterranean 
Fleet and to remove foreign nuclear stockpiles – proved strategically ineffectual at best. Yet both 
actions carried numerous domestic benefits. For one, they were both highly visible and tangible 
acts, which portrayed a sharp contrast to the muted diplomatic style exercised by leaders of the 
Fourth Republic. Secondly, both actions had broad support across the French political spectrum, 
which helped reinforce the claims of de Gaulle as embodiment of national unity.  
The second half of the chapter examines the role of de Gaulle‟s official state visits to the 
United Kingdom and the United States in April 1960. Both events – marginalized (and, more 
often, not mentioned at all) by previous literature – helped support Gaullist claims of a national 
12 
 
renaissance under de Gaulle‟s leadership. Using all the symbolism he could muster, de Gaulle 
evoked immense enthusiasm in both countries which, in turn, transfixed French newspapers for 
the duration of his official trip. The overwhelming passion and exuberance shown to de Gaulle 
by the UK and US crowds suggests, as the chapter reflects, that the events helped influence the 
French public‟s own perception of their president.   
Through these various diplomatic efforts, de Gaulle and company hoped to construct a 
persuasive narrative about the ostensible benefits of the Gaullist constitutional reforms 
implemented in 1958. De Gaulle capitalized on popular socio-economic and cultural anxieties 
from the period, namely the omnipresent Cold War and the fears of “Americanization,” to carry 
out a foreign policy with broad popular appeal. But before he could serve as the stately 
personification of the Fifth Republic – the indefatigable “Republican Monarch,” in Debré‟s 




CHAPTER 1: GAULLISM AND THE PURSUIT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM 
 
 In 1959, the first full year of the Fifth French Republic, Gaullist intellectual Raymond 
Aron reflected on the events which had recently unfolded:  
The crisis which General de Gaulle had always predicted but which he had 
waited for so long in vain was brought on by the Algerian War … and [with 
it] the General had again become a national hero, „the most illustrious of 
Frenchmen.‟ In 1958 he gave France a constitution as he had passionately 
wanted to do for nearly twenty years, and as he very likely would have been 
able to twelve years sooner had he shown the tactical skill, moderation, and 
charm of which he had given so many proofs during recent months.
1
     
The creation of the Fifth Republic constitution, as Aron noted, was not simply a byproduct of the 
unfolding events of 1958. Instead, its birth culminated from years of trying, in vain, on the part 
of Charles de Gaulle and his many companions to affect a lasting change to the French political 
system. The Gaullists deemed reform necessary and, in 1958, inevitable to ensure governmental 
strength in times of crisis and a structure that promoted national unity and mitigated disparate 
social tensions.   
 The goal of this chapter, then, is to establish the preeminence of constitutional reform to 
the overall Gaullist agenda. In doing so, it challenges the prevailing narrative that has long 
dictated the historiography of Gaullist foreign policy, one that assumes that de Gaulle‟s 
diplomatic ventures were confined to international goals – from enhancing France‟s global 
standing to precipitating détente within the Cold War. The diplomatic histories on the subject 
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have, thus far, generally neglected not only the domestic developments and concerns that 
influenced Gaullist policy but also the importance with which he regarded constitutional reform.  
The reader will quickly note the heavy reliance on secondary literature in this chapter. Indeed, it 
hardly reveals anything new regarding the political developments surrounding the founding of 
the Fifth Republic. What is new, however, is its placement within the context of a larger work on 
Gaullist foreign policy.  
 This chapter hopes to establish the value that the Gaullists placed on constitutional 
reform; something that long predated concerns about France‟s international standing in the Fifth 
Republic. Once we understand the central role this domestic priority played to their overall 
agenda, we can then, in the preceding chapters, examine how foreign policy augmented domestic 
concerns.   
THE FOURTH REPUBLIC: GAULLISM‟S POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
Once the war in Europe ended in mid-1945, the reestablished states of Western and 
Central Europe held parliamentary elections which brought the eventual return of political 
parties. Lurid memories of fascism propelled many states to opt for parliamentary-led coalition 
governments.
2
 In France, with elections in 1945, the result was no different. The major winners, 
the Socialist Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the Communist Party (PCF), 
and the newly-formed Christian-Democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) each 
garnered approximately one quarter of the vote of the Constituent Assembly responsible for state 
restoration. The three-way coalition opted to preserve de Gaulle, prominent thanks to his 
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wartime leadership of the Free French, as head of the postwar provisional government and 
moved to draft a new constitution. The political wrangling which accompanied the debates over 
state budgetary matters and constitutional reform soon became too much for the Free French 
leader. De Gaulle, feeling the limits of his influence and disillusioned by the return of the aspects 
he reviled in the Third Republic, opted to resign on 20 January 1946.
3
 On his heels followed the 
loyal Gaullist ministers, many of whom had forged a relationship with de Gaulle during the war 
and were unaffiliated with the three parties of the coalition.
4
  
In resigning, de Gaulle greatly overestimated his own importance and influence. The 
quarreling of the political parties, as he saw it, would inevitably lead to their collapse and, with 
it, a chorus of cries for his return. He was wrong. The postwar coalition of the SFIO, PCF, and 
MRP proved perfectly capable of continuing without him. Soon, the leftist contingent of the 
three-way political coalition produced a constitution which they put to national referendum. Not 
surprisingly, the Gaullists vehemently rejected the constitution, but they were not alone. The 
majority of the French public, including the center-right MRP, also rejected it. With the 
                                                          
 
3
 Maurice Agulhon, The French Republic 1879-1992, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1993), 320-21, 334-35, Frank Giles, The Locust Years: The Story of the Fourth French Republic, 1946-1958 (New 
York: Carroll and Graf, 1994), 18-28, and Julian Jackson, De Gaulle (London: Hans Publishing, 2003), 31-43.   
4
 Following the liberation in 1944, de Gaulle founding himself accompanied by a number of loyal 
compatriots, all of whom adhered to the principles and sentiments espoused by the General himself. These converts, 
wedded to a particular and often romantic vision of France, formed the collective known as Gaullism. We must look 
back on the formative years of the Gaullist movement to understand the commonality between the men attracted to 
its particular political philosophy. The movement was forged in the isolation of de Gaulle‟s wartime headquarters in 
London, severed from the parliamentary democracy that epitomized the French republic. The figures who felt 
compelled to join de Gaulle accepted, even embraced, the authoritarian wartime structure which defined the early 
Free French operation. The adherents of Gaullism were also attracted to the notions of unity ostensibly embodied in 
one man. Together, the group engaged actively within, and often against, the conventions of the Fourth Republic. 




constitution‟s failure, de Gaulle saw an opportunity to reenter the fray with hopes of influencing 
the outcome of the revised constitution.
5
 
His efforts culminated in the speech at Bayeux, France on 16 June 1946. This effort 
became the official Gaullist prescription for constitutional reform. In typical Gaullist fashion, the 
speech was replete with symbolism. Outfitted in his military uniform adorned with the Free 
French insignia, surrounded by fellow veterans, and located at the site associated with the allied 
landings of 1944, de Gaulle launched into his speech. The philosophy of liberal monarchist 
Montesquieu and the ruminations of loyal compatriot Michel Debré provided the intellectual 
inspiration for the speech.
6
 In it, de Gaulle denounced his usual targets. He chastised the Third 
Republic and the “rivalry of the parties” which, he argued, too often disregarded “the higher 
interests of the country.”
7
 Eventually, he offered his prescription for the governmental ills of 
France: the country required a strong Head of State, separate from the parliament and “situated 
above the parties,” who could “reconcile the general interest” of the French public.
8
 He, like 
Debré and others, envisioned a strong leader, answerable to the people alone, as the only way to 
precipitate national unity.   
These proclamations proved incredibly audacious following years of dictatorial rule 
during the war. The speech and, more importantly, de Gaulle‟s haughty delivery reflected a 
profound misunderstanding of fundamental postwar changes to governance. Indeed, the 
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prevalence of parliamentary coalitions throughout Western Europe, not just France, was a 
conscious response to the memories of a discredited authoritarianism.
9
 Given his conspicuous 
denouncements of the Third Republic and parliamentary democracy, the left proved quick to 
ascribe fascist and Bonapartist labels to the General and the Gaullist doctrines. Ultimately, the 
politicians in Paris, conscious of France‟s recent past and intent on preventing any one political 
force – especially Communist or Gaullist – from gaining too much influence, rejected his advice. 
Shortly afterward, the French public approved, if narrowly, the constitution of the Fourth 
Republic, the structure of which closely mirrored the Third Republic, thereby leaving ultimate 
power in the hands of the assembly.
10
  Frustrated with the outcome, de Gaulle departed to rethink 
his political strategy to affect change.  
Within months of the speech at Bayeux, key Gaullist groups began sowing seeds for a 
broad political movement against the reviled Fourth Republic. As early as October 1946, a secret 
group of Gaullists led by André Malraux and joined by Jacques Soustelle, Pierre Lefranc, and 
Jacques Foccart among others, began plotting a movement which would allow for de Gaulle‟s 
political return. De Gaulle himself also began courting reliable allies, drawn mostly from his 
collection of wartime compatriots. By early 1947, the foundation of the group was intact. The 
movement took the name Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French People), or 
RPF for short and included in its ranks the most notable of Gaullists: Malraux, Soustelle, 
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Foccart, Debré, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas.
11
 The movement sought to “group the French 
people” in a way that allowed them to develop policies “independent of any single political party 
aspirations.”
12
 This goal, on the surface, sounded benign enough. The RPF, however, intended to 
garner enough votes to become the majority party and, once there, precipitate the downfall of the 
Fourth Republic.  
The hardening of the Cold War in the summer of 1947 provided the backdrop for the rise 
of the RPF. With the tightening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the establishment of the 
Cominform, accompanied by American offers for monetary aid, the major governing parties in 
France quickly ostracized the French Communist Party and moved to block it from gaining any 
positions of influence. With the perceived rise of an external Communist threat, the RPF, too, 
turned its focus on the PCF. Whereas a narrative of constitutional change marked the RPF‟s first 
months of existence, by mid-summer 1947 the RPF‟s platform focused narrowly on anti-
communism. This singular focus, a more compelling message than institutional reform, allowed 
the RPF to attract a wide array of voters, robbing the major parties of many of their 
constituencies.
13
 In its first elections, in 1947, the RPF won 38% of the French vote. Within a 
year, the RPF had over one million members. The movement effectively launched a successful 
monthly journal, Liberté de l’espirit, edited by Claude Mauriac and enhanced by contributors 
such as Raymond Aron. By 1951, the RPF was the largest party in French politics.
14
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These successes, however, belied the limits of the RPF.  The mainstream parties soon 
viewed the RPF, like the French Communist Party, as a danger to the republic. They quickly 
moved to stigmatize the RPF, making efforts to prevent their members from participating in the 
movement. This is, perhaps, not surprising. The RPF‟s entire reason for being was to gain 
enough support to extinguish the Fourth Republic and, with it, the political parties. Additionally, 
the RPF operated with a militancy rivaled only by the French communists. As the PCF, in their 
fall from a central government role, became increasingly reactionary, the RPF too took on an 
aggressive and, at times, violent role in French politics. Opponents quickly labeled the RPF as a 
radical far-right, even fascist, entity. Ominously to many, the RPF and the PCF, both of which 
envisioned the downfall of the existing political order, were the two largest parties in French 
politics by the late 1940s.
15
  
The mainstream parties, namely the MRP, the SFIO, and the smaller Radicals and 
Moderates, responded to this dual-sided threat with a system of political alliances, called the 
Third Force, which prevented either fringe party from gaining electoral prominence. The 
reluctance of the RPF and PCF to compromise with the other parties furthered their isolation. By 
1951 a loss of 350,000 members accompanied waning electoral success for the RPF.
16
 The final 
death knell came when a leading member of the movement, Jacques Soustelle, responded to calls 
from President Vincent Auriol to play a larger role in the National Assembly. Disillusioned by 
the RPF‟s active participation in the “games, poisons, and delights of the system” it was meant to 
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end, de Gaulle abandoned the movement in May 1953 and turned to what Malraux deemed the 
“political wilderness.”
17
    
From his political departure in 1953 until his grand return in May, 1958, de Gaulle abided 
in a quiet retirement at Colombey-les-deux-Églises. After his failed efforts at Bayeaux and 
through the RPF, de Gaulle became jaded regarding the Fourth Republic. As he told C.L 
Sulzberger in 1955, “Regimes never reform themselves. They simply fall. They collapse.” 
Indeed, he added, no meaningful constitutional change could occur under the Fourth Republic, 
“this regime must first vanish – as the regime vanished in 1940.”
18
 Other prominent Gaullists, 
meanwhile, such as Soustelle and Debré remained active within the Fourth Republic, often as 
outspoken critics of the republic and its positions on decolonization, the Cold War, and European 
integration, among other issues. The parliamentary Gaullists that outlasted the RPF as well as de 
Gaulle himself eventually coalesced in the spring of 1958 with the Algerian War as backdrop to 
institute the long-sought end of the Fourth Republic.  
THE ALGERIAN WAR AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC  
  After engaging in the political arena through several endeavors – mainly the speech at 
Bayeux and the RPF – during the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle had not only learned the limits of 
his influence but also tarnished his public image in the process. Indeed, upon emerging from the 
war, de Gaulle embodied, to many, national unity. His image appeared above the political fray, 
his name inseparable from the credibility of the Free French and the Resistance. Yet, after his 
involvement in the RPF, de Gaulle seemed to many, at best, a contributor to the partisanship and 
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political fighting he claimed to oppose and, at worst (as the left would liken him), a threat to the 
Republic and democracy itself. Other Gaullist leaders too, like Soustelle and Debré in particular, 
often represented reactionary and oppositional forces within the Fourth Republic, which did little 
to further their image.  
 By the spring of 1958, the Gaullists had learned their lesson. When the events which 
precipitating de Gaulle‟s political return arose, he waited until the opportunity was ripe for him 
to implement the long sought-after constitutional revisions.
19
 Only after he was guaranteed full 
powers to rewrite the constitution did he return. The others too, Debré, Malraux, and Soustelle 
among them, moved behind the scenes in different arenas to clear the way for de Gaulle‟s return.  
 Two narratives emerged in 1958, largely crafted by the Gaullists themselves, which 
emphasized the necessity and therefore inevitability of de Gaulle‟s ascension to power and 
subsequent constitutional reform. The first, in May and June 1958, posited that only de Gaulle, 
the human embodiment of national unity, could bring a palatable resolution to the ongoing 
quagmire in Algeria while, in the process, staving off the ubiquitous threats of civil war. The 
second narrative to emerge, in the autumn of 1958, stressed the dire need for the French public to 
approve the Fifth Republic constitution, thereby ending the short-lived Fourth Republic. All the 
while, the apparent dangers of the Algerian War provided the backdrop for the unfolding events.  
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   The war in Algeria had, by 1958, raged for four grueling years as the French fought to 
suppress the Algerian nationalists‟ bid for independence. Algeria was first established as a 
French colony in 1830 and, by 1954, had become a part of metropolitan France, divided into 
three departments and answerable to the French Ministry of the Interior. Algeria‟s strong ties to 
France made the conflict‟s potential to divide enormous. Support for Algérie Française ranged 
from Gaullists to Socialists.
20
 The left, meanwhile, bitterly opposed what they deemed as 
France‟s nationalist and imperialistic agenda.
21
 Complicating matters further was the fate of 
nearly one million French settlers who lived in the North African colony and whose fate hinged 
on the preservation of Algérie Française. The dire stakes made the settler population a boisterous 
and demanding political force, intent on preventing any concessions to the Algerian nationalist 
forces. Their actions, greatly supported by the French military, directed the government towards 
an increasingly hard line against the Algerian opposition.
22
 The left proved militant in their anti-
imperial stance, rivaled only by the settler population‟s conviction for colonial preservation.  
 The tensions between factions, which had steadily risen since the beginning of the war, 
came to a fore on 13 May 1958 when a large mob of settlers in Algiers rioted over the investiture 
of the Christian-Democrat Pierre Pflimlin, a moderate politician openly in favor of negotiation 
with the Algerian nationalists. Alongside the protestors, two leading military figures based in 
Algiers, Generals Jacques Massu and Raoul Salan, formed a Committee of Public Safety intent 
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on forcing governmental change in Paris. The common denominator between the two groups – 
the rioting settlers and the conspiring generals – was General de Gaulle. Both parties believed de 




 But why the General? What distinguished him, at this moment of uncertainty, as the 
staunch and steadfast ally of French Algeria? Certainly, it was not de Gaulle himself. He never, 
during his time in the political spotlight, presented a clear position on French Algeria and he 
withdrew from politics a year before the Algerian War began. He did not offer comments on the 
subject in his infrequent public remarks made between 1953 and 1958 thereafter. If de Gaulle 
remained silent, however, fellow Gaullist Jacques Soustelle did not. Soustelle served as 
Governor-General in Algeria in 1955-56. He became one of the most outspoken adherents to 
French Algeria and, in doing so, won over many of the conservative Algerian settlers to the 
Gaullist cause. The military too found themselves often aligned with Soustelle‟s conservatism. 
These elements converged to help encourage the return of de Gaulle as developments ostensibly 
worsened for the settlers in spring 1958.
24
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 Eventually, after more than a week of plotting, the conspiring generals in Algiers acted. 
On the evening of 24 May, Massu and Salan, utilizing paratroopers, carried out “Operation 
Resurrection,” a bloodless coup which seized control of Corsica. The generals threatened to 
capture Paris next and install de Gaulle by force.
25
 In response, 200,000 people, led by the 
French Communist Party, demonstrated in the capital to denounce the overt use of military force 
and the conditions under which de Gaulle was called to power.
26
 The regime in Paris, 
meanwhile, found itself stuck in an impasse. Government leaders vacillated between several 
options. Should they respond to the revolting military factions with force, thereby initiating a 
full-blown civil war? Or should they appease the parties in Algeria through a renewed 
commitment to the preservation of French Algeria? The final, and most politically viable, option 
was to bring back General de Gaulle, the sole figure, the leaders assumed, with enough moral 
capital to pacify the rebelling military figures and preserve domestic unity.
27
 
  By month‟s end, the tide had shifted in favor of de Gaulle‟s political return. Prime 
Minister Pflimlin found himself incapable of reconciling the various political parties for unified 
action. President René Coty, meanwhile, continued to pressure Pflimlin for de Gaulle‟s return. 
The tensions in Algiers and Paris continued to mount, as the threat of a military coup in Paris 
loomed. In the background, meanwhile, de Gaulle seized the opportunity to fuel the controversy. 
In a bold statement, given at a press conference in Paris on 19 May 1958, as the leaders in Paris 
searched for feasible alternatives, he stated that “the time may have come” for him to be 
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“directly useful to France once again.”
28
 Additionally, despite its apparent illegality, de Gaulle 
made no effort to publicly condemn the military insurrection carried out in his name.
29
 In Paris, 
Pflimlin found himself out of feasible options to mitigate the situation. Faced with seemingly 
unresolvable problems and increasingly vocal calls for de Gaulle‟s return, he resigned on 28 
May.
30
 The following day President Coty called upon de Gaulle to form a government.
31
    
 De Gaulle embarked on his new task without hesitation. Before the National Assembly 
on 1 June 1958, he outlined the demands – which included full emergency powers for six months 
and the grounds to write a new constitution – for his investiture. Shortly following his speech, in 
a vote of 329 to 244, the National Assembly ceded to de Gaulle‟s request and dealt what proved 
to be the death knell of the Fourth Republic.
32
  In his speech de Gaulle described national 
conditions starkly: 
The rapidly accelerating degradation of the State, the immediate danger to 
French unity, Algeria in the throes of trials and emotions, Corsica suffering 
from a feverish contagion, opposing movements in Metropolitan France 
hourly whipping up their passions and, reinforcing their action, the Army … 
shocked by the lack of any real authority, our international position 
disparaged even within our alliances – such is the situation of our country. 
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At this very moment … [France] finds herself threatened by disruption and 
perhaps even civil war.
33
  
At his most melodramatic, de Gaulle made a case for the dire need for his return. In his speech, 
he implied that the Fourth Republic‟s political leaders and institutions lacked the capacity to 
solve the problems confronting France. He sought to construct the impression that France faced 
its current perils as a result of its flawed institutional framework but that, given the means to do 
so, he could rectify France‟s course. In the process, he warned of civil war and argued that the 
nation needed unity (and a capable unifier). He aimed to position himself, in France‟s time of 
need, as the one solely “responsible for the unity, integrity, and independence of France.”
34
 He 
cast himself as the paternal figure – clearly drawing from his wartime legacy, not his dubious 




 De Gaulle promptly assembled a team meant to deliberate and draft the new constitution. 
In June 1958 de Gaulle, and a hand-picked team, headed by Michel Debré and including 
members from the leading French political parties, gathered at the Hôtel Matignon in Paris to 
begin the drafting process.
36
   The constitution was, undoubtedly, derivative of Debré‟s 
principles outlined in de Gaulle‟s famed speech at Bayeux in 1946.  Indeed, the central feature of 
the Fifth Republic constitution was the creation of a strong presidential figure, separate from 
parliament, meant to lend stability and undermine divisiveness in French politics.   
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 The final product, the constitution of the Fifth Republic, embodied all of the tenets the 
Gaullists valued dearly. First, it instituted a strong presidential position, the personification of 
national leadership, elected by universal suffrage and an absolute majority of votes cast. The 
president – the sole “protector of the independence of the nation” – possessed the power to select 
and dismiss a prime minister at will and, more importantly, had the capacity to dissolve the 
National Assembly.
37
 The final draft of the constitution made it clear that the Gaullists intended 
the president – what Debré deemed the “republican monarch” – to serve as the central 
government figure, no longer answerable to parliament.
38
  
 The creation of the undeniably strong, and independent, presidential figure was a huge 
departure from the constitutional framework of the Fourth Republic, which derived its legitimacy 
from parliament – the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The president served a 
largely a symbolic role in the Fourth Republic and possessed severely limited powers. Equally, 
the Prime Minister relied on approval from parliament before he could take power.
39
 In times of 
ministerial conflict there were frequent changes of Prime Ministers, as coalition-based political 
majorities shifted. In the twelve years between de Gaulle‟s departure in 1946 and his return in 
1958, the Fourth Republic witnessed 22 different Prime Ministers.
40
 The Gaullists attributed 
France‟s every failure, like the virtual collapse in May 1958, to this arrangement which they 
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believed undermined Prime Ministerial efforts to project legitimacy and leadership in times of 
crisis. 
Eventually, by late summer 1958 Debré and his team completed the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic. Next, it was put to the test of the French people via referendum. During the 
month of September, de Gaulle set out to ensure its adoption. He made two appeals to the nation, 
requesting their full-fledged support of the nascent republic. In typical Gaullist fashion, he 
outlined the needs of the moment in grandiose terms.
41
 As he ended his address on 4 September, 
1958, he illustrated the magnitude of the decision confronting the French public: 
Here, women and men of France, is what inspires and what makes up the 
Constitution which, on September 28, will be submitted to your vote. With 
all my heart, in the name of France, I ask you to answer “Yes.” If you do 
not vote thus, we shall return, that very day, to the bad old ways with which 
you are familiar. But if you do, the result will make the Republic strong and 
effective … But there will also be, in this positive display of the national 
will, the proof that our country is regaining its unity and, by the same token, 
its opportunity for grandeur. The world, which understands full well what 
importance our decision will have for it, will draw the inevitable conclusion 
… A great hope will rise over France. I think it has already risen.
42
  
The importance of the new constitution, according to de Gaulle, transcended the domestic needs 
of the country. He framed the significance of the referendum around two weightier themes – 
national unity and international opinion. On September 26, on the eve of the referendum, de 
Gaulle made one last appeal. “Women and men of France … in asking you to choose 
effectiveness of the state and national unity, I believe I am expressing what the many, many 
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generations that built the nation down through the centuries have hoped for it.”
43
  History, he 
claimed, was on his side. 
 Leading up to the referendum, the Gaullists had the public on their side. Since his 
investiture, de Gaulle had capably painted himself as the answer for all whom, after four years of 
uncertain progress, wanted a resolution to the Algerian War (even if differences lingered over 
what “resolution” meant). From his tour of Africa and his ambiguous “I have understood you” 
speech in Algiers in June 1958, he allayed settler concerns about his commitment to their cause. 
In metropolitan France he positioned himself as the only one capable of resolving the colonial 
conflict. The public‟s loss of faith in the Fourth Republic meanwhile, thanks to perceived 
mismanagement of the economy and the ongoing war, only strengthened the Gaullists‟ bid.
44
 
 The Gaullists used the mandate given to them to pursue constitutional reform. By 
including prominent members of the leading political parties in the drafting process, the Gaullists 
effectively silenced potential opposition to the constitution in the weeks leading up to the 
referendum. The PCF provided the only vocal hostility to the constitution which, given the 
public‟s investment in de Gaulle, served to alienate the Communist Party further.
45
  These factors 
contributed to a groundswell of support for de Gaulle. Heading into the referendum, 72% of the 
public professed confidence in the constitution despite the fact that only 36% felt “sufficiently 
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well informed to vote” (compared to 55% who replied negatively).
46
 On the day of the 
referendum, the country headed to the polls and, with an overwhelming majority, approved the 
Fifth Republic constitution. Of those who voted, 80% voted “yes.”
47
 The republic began its life 
in auspicious fashion. 
 With the referendum a success, and after years of hard fought and messy political 
activism, the Gaullists ushered in their long-desired constitutional reform. The Gaullists finally 
gained the opportunity in 1958 after a war-weary public, invested in the promise of de Gaulle, 
proved willing to accede to institutionalized Gaullism. With this, de Gaulle emerged as the 
figurehead and personification of the new government. While Debré, the Fifth Republic‟s first 
Prime Minister, and others operated the day-to-day administration of the new government, the 
theatrics of statecraft were reserved for the “Republican Monarch.” This arrangement allowed 
the young Republic to present one singular, stable, and commanding figure – the wartime hero of 
Charles de Gaulle – as the main focal point of government, in stark contrast to the ever-changing 
rotation of Prime Ministers under the Fourth Republic. The President, left responsible for the 
“honor and integrity of France” fashioned a foreign policy meant to portray national renewal and 
buttress national support in the early Fifth Republic. Employing a nationalist foreign policy, 
which responded to the widespread social anxieties of 1950s France, offered the French 
President an opportunity to bolster his claims to embodying national unity. 
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SERVICE 
OF THE GAULLIST DOMESTIC AGENDA    
 
In 1882, Ernest Renan, the father of French nationalism, lectured about the defining 
aspects of nationhood in his speech “What is a Nation?” In it, he proposed the following: 
To have common glories in the past and common will in the present; to 
have done great things together and to will that we do them again: these are 
the conditions essential for being a people…A heritage of glory and regrets 
to share in the past; one and the same programme to be realized in the 
future. To have suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together is worth more than 
customs agreements and frontiers that conform to strategic ideas; and this is 
what we understand in spite of racial and linguistic diversity. A moment ago 
I said „to have suffered together‟: indeed, suffering in common unites more 
than joy. In matters of national memory, mourning has more validity than 
triumph, since it imposes duties which demand a common effort. A nation 
is therefore the expression of a great solidarity constituted by a feeling for 




National unity, Renan suggested, owed more to shared sorrow and a collective aspiration, not 
political or ethnic homogeneity. This axiom proved central to the Gaullist vision of grandeur at a 
time when a generation of French, from 1940 to 1958, faced a seemingly endless array of trials 
and challenges. As de Gaulle‟s inaugural address on 8 January 1958 clearly reflected: 
 During the last half century [France] has been more gravely wounded … 
than at any previous time in its history. But now, it has suddenly been 
offered an opportunity to emerge from doubt, from dissentions, from 
humiliations. And now our country wants to seize this opportunity by 
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De Gaulle framed the travails of France in a way which minimized the internal struggles and 
divisions and instead emphasized commonality, both in sacrifice and general will.
3
 
 The notions of unity and revival de Gaulle purposefully evoked in his inaugural address 
are central to the argument of this chapter. It contends that the Gaullists, with the founding of the 
Fifth Republic, sought to use grandeur, that ambiguous and ill-defined ideal, as the galvanizing 
force with which to reinforce their narrative of national rejuvenation. Indeed, it is not 
coincidental that de Gaulle reserved his message of France‟s rise from the ashes for his inaugural 
address: that day, in Gaullist lore, marked the start of a new epoch. One which, as the Gaullists 
hoped to portray, signaled a seismic shift from the follies of the Fourth Republic (and earlier) to 
an era of governmental stability and common ambition under the unifying force of President de 
Gaulle. As Chapter One sought to demonstrate, constitutional reform proved the central ambition 
of de Gaulle and his closest advisors (Debré especially). Chapter Two seeks to illustrate how 
nationalism and foreign policy served to legitimize the Gaullist Fifth Republic through popular 
support. It serves to demonstrate why foreign policy, among other things, proved central to the 
Gaullist narrative of national renewal and unity with which they used to bolster domestic 
support.    
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THE NEED FOR NATIONALISM AND GRANDEUR  
 With de Gaulle‟s return to power in 1958, the Gaullists saw a revival of nationalism as an 
integral part of their efforts to unify the republic and to gain legitimacy for the new institutions. 
The Algerian War and the rapid, if uneven, social change and economic resurgence of the 1950s 
– to say nothing of the unresolved cleavage created during World War II – divided the country 
along fierce ideological lines. Moreover, the Gaullists believed the “party system” of the Fourth 
Republic failed to provide the French people with an inspiring, galvanizing national vision in 
response to these challenges. With this in mind, the Gaullists saw an opportunity to employ 
nationalistic themes which emphasized commonality and downplayed societal differences. They 
aimed to foster national unity and counter competing social pressures while simultaneously 
juxtaposing the Fifth Republic from its defunct predecessor. Additionally, nationalism, displayed 
in both rhetoric and tangible (if often ineffectual) acts and policies, served to garner public 
support, and with it legitimacy, for the leader of a newly stable and active republic.  
Nationalism, in general, serves as an effective tool for galvanizing support for governing 
institutions – in this case for the Gaullist Fifth Republic – and reinforcing societal cohesion. 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm once argued that nationalist rhetoric‟s “very vagueness and lack of 
programmatic content gives it a potentially universal support within its own community.”
4
 De 
Gaulle and his team understood that nationalism‟s universal appeal could work to further 
integrate factions of society into a broader national community. Reinforcement of a common 
national message, via nationalistic themes and rhetoric, could then help counter societal tensions. 
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Equally, if large portions of society attached themselves to the nationalistic themes emanating 
from national leadership, legitimacy is thus conferred upon the state, its institutions, and 
programs.
5
    
De Gaulle understood the galvanizing potential of nationalism. When, for instance, his 
Minister of Information, Alain Peyrefitte, noted the positive effect of nationalistic language in 
his rhetoric, de Gaulle explained the use enthusiastically: 
 Of course, that‟s what happens! The French again become French! We live 
in difficult times. It is necessary to rise above special interests. If we divide 
ourselves, if we quarrel, we are lost. One must create the conditions for the 
union of the French, and to do that one must awaken their national feelings. 
When the French divide themselves and quarrel, I speak to them of France.
6
 
Nationalism, with its unifying potential, offered de Gaulle and the Gaullists an opportunity to 
drive home a common, if generic, message which reached all levels of French society. 
Nationalist discourse offered the Gaullists a chance to gain appeal on all sides of the political 
spectrum and among all factions and, if not, make it difficult for opposing factions to offer a 
compelling counterargument.   
 Gaullist nationalism frequently hinged on notions of greatness and the need for the 
French people to strive for grandeur. De Gaulle conjured notions of grandeur, in his rhetoric and 
actions, because he understood its ideals possessed an attraction on both sides of the French 
political spectrum which, when employed effectively, could strengthen his bid for unity. He 
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argued, for instance, that the French had “a need to feel pride in France.”
7
 This idea had the 
potential to speak to French men and women of all stripes, despite competing visions for the 
future (from European integration to France‟s Cold War stance and decolonization).  
De Gaulle‟s notion of national pride tapped into the consensus, which blurred the lines 
between the French right and left, that presupposed that France remained exceptional and 
occupied a special place amongst nations, even if relegated to a reduced international role in the 
postwar era.
8
 All societal factions could agree that the French nation deserved self-respect and, 
with it, international respect. For many, this meant preserving an independent voice and identity 
– and resistance to a muted and subordinate role vulnerable to the dictates of others (whether in 
the machinations of the European Common Market or the NATO alliance) – even in the face of 
diminished global influence. Grandeur, of course, championed this notion of national self-worth. 
De Gaulle‟s appeal to these sensibilities, at a time when France grappled with its own 
insecurities, had far-reaching potential. 
The Gaullists believed nationalism and grandeur could construct a narrative which 
appealed to many and subdued ideological differences in favor of a common ideal. Certainly, the 
constant rhetoric of national renewal and grandeur did much to signify a changed political 
atmosphere and illustrate the departure from the Fourth Republic. These concepts of nationalism, 
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as we shall see, influenced the formation of Gaullist foreign policy. But first, we must turn our 
attention to a brief contextualization of France‟s role in the Cold War. 
FRANCE AND THE COLD WAR 
Before analyzing the formation of Gaullist foreign policy, one needs to define France‟s 
relationship to the Cold War. It is essential to note that France‟s perception of the Cold War and 
its own interests were starkly different from that of its Western allies. The United States emerged 
from World War II intact and confident, able and inclined, by 1947, to focus its attention on 
waging the Cold War.
9
 In contrast, France emerged from the war physically and financially 
devastated and torn by societal divisions exacerbated by the bitter civil war that ensued during 
the Occupation.
10
 Adding further difficulties, almost immediately following World War II the 
French launched into an unending series of colonial conflicts: first a war in Indochina (1946-
1954) and then, with barely a pause, the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962).
11
 Thus, it is 
perhaps not surprising that, given the imperatives of domestic reconstruction and preserving its 
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crumbling empire, France was not prepared to commit itself wholeheartedly to the US‟ Cold War 
agenda.  
In the early days of the Cold War, the US and France were at odds from a strategic 
standpoint as well. While the US fixed its gaze on the Soviet Union and its perceived threats to 
US interests, France remained preoccupied by its Eastern neighbor, Germany.
12
 The shocking 
defeat of 1940 and the subsequent occupation proved too fresh a memory for fears of German 
resurgence to be allayed.
13
 Contrarily, the French, unlike the US, viewed the Soviet Union more 
positively. Since the late nineteenth century, Russia (and eventually the Soviet Union) served, on 
numerous occasions, as a traditional ally to France and an Eastern counterweight to a strong 
German presence in Central Europe.
14
 Even at the height of the Cold War, the majority of the 
French population harbored no distrust or disdain for the Soviet Union.
15
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 Thus, given France‟s moderate view of the Soviet Union, France‟s drift into the Western 
camp in the late 1940s was, in no way, an obvious choice. The country fell into NATO more out 
of need than by ideological preference. The US‟ willingness to offer Western Europe funds via 
the Marshall Plan and other means, connected with the valuable ties to the US through French 
businessmen like Jean Monnet made the US appear preferential to the governing parties at a time 
when France was in desperate need of aid.
16
 Meanwhile, with French plans for German 
containment failing to gain traction following the war, the US offered the only alternative answer 
to fears of a revanchist Eastern neighbor. This became more apparent thanks to perceived Soviet 
intransigence in 1947-1948: the creation of the Soviet Communist Information Bureau – the so-
called “Cominform” – in 1947, the refusal of Marshall Aid in Eastern Europe, and the blockade 
of Berlin in 1948.
17
 Circumstances, therefore, did far more than any natural inclination to dictate 
France‟s drift westward in the late 1940s.  
The tepid enthusiasm for the Atlantic Alliance felt in large segments of society reflected 
this sentiment. There existed, for many, a lingering belief that France should maintain a neutral 
stance. When asked in November 1958, for instance, whether they felt France‟s “allegiance 
should be toward the West, toward the East, or neither,” 48% of Frenchmen responded “neither” 
compared to only 24% who chose the West.
18
 Whereas many French were glad to obtain a 
                                                          
16
 Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 74-76. 
17
 Judt, Postwar, 116-17, 142-50. The Cominform, which succeeded the Communist International 
(abandoned in 1943), was ostensibly designed to coordinate policy amongst international communist parties. The 
real intention, of course, was to ensure Soviet control over the international communist movement and maintain 
preeminent status amongst communist entities. The result in France was the alienation of the PCF which, between 
1945-1947, proved to be an integral part of the governmental coalition. After 1947 the PCF was reduced to a 
reactionary mouthpiece for Soviet thought and a denouncer of most Western policies.    
18
 When asked “Personally, do you think that as this time France‟s allegiance should be toward the West, 
toward the East, or neither,” 24% said “West,” 4% said “East,” 48% said “Neither,” and 24% did not know. See 
Gallup Public Opinion Polls, 269.   
39 
 
security agreement from the US with regard to Germany, they were less excited about entering 
into America‟s broader Cold War campaign. 
GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR 
 The previous section served to complicate our perception of France‟s role in the Cold 
War and to remind the reader that anxieties came with equal force from both directions (east and 
west), which served to obscure, for many in France, the rigid delineations the bloc system 
presupposed. Thus, French ambivalence about the Cold War could not have failed to influence 
de Gaulle‟s diplomatic agenda. De Gaulle sought to orchestrate a foreign policy which would 
elicit the greatest domestic response, given France‟s limited ability to influence international 
affairs. As Henry Kissinger noted, “Governing a country racked by a generation of conflict and 
decades of humiliation, de Gaulle judged policies not so much according to pragmatic criteria as 
according to whether they could contribute to the restoration of French self-esteem.”
19
 The 
overriding goal of ensuring governmental legitimacy and the appearance of national unity 
directed de Gaulle towards a policy which had broad popular appeal.  
  In this effort, given the strength of the French Communist Party, confronting the Soviet 
Union would have proven divisive and thus undermined Gaullist efforts to project de Gaulle as a 
national unifier. On a practical level too, France, a mid-size power of limited influence, could do 
little to alter Soviet intransigence or hasten détente. Lastly, given de Gaulle‟s domestic 
orientation, it is worth noting, as political scientist Philip Cerny asserted, that his foreign policy 
“ought not be so grandiose as to upset the international system in such a way as to cause other 
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states to injure France.”
20
 It remained imperative, therefore, to devise a strategy that elicited the 
strongest domestic reaction, one which had broad appeal, without actually disturbing 
international stability. With this goal in mind, the Soviet Union would have made an impractical 
target for his foreign policy of grandeur, both ideologically and strategically.  
Therefore, when devising his foreign policy, de Gaulle understood that confronting the 
American-led NATO alliance offered the greatest benefits for arousing French nationalist 
sentiment and achieving a palatable consensus amongst disparate political and ideological 
factions. As we have seen, the French did not universally perceive the Soviet Union as an 
adversary. It thus lacked the galvanizing potential that de Gaulle sought in developing his foreign 
policy of grandeur. Contrarily, the Atlantic Alliance drew criticism from across the political 
spectrum (from the left who resented France‟s western orientation to the right who felt France 
should play a more fruitful role within the alliance). Equally, lingering factors fueled rampant 
anti-Americanism in France that cut across political lines. These aspects, as we shall see, 
combined with France‟s increasing role in NATO in the late 1950s, converged to make the US-
led Atlantic Alliance the optimal target for de Gaulle‟s foreign policy goals.  
For one, there was frustration among the French political elite regarding the US‟s 
influence – and interference – in European politics. Many felt exasperation toward the United 
States‟ role in advocating the European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and its 
seemingly preferential treatment toward Germany during the EDC debates.
21
 Equally, the 1956 
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Anglo-French expedition in Suez was largely thwarted by American pressure.
22
 Moreover, 
Washington‟s constant public disapproval of France‟s colonial ambitions left the French 
leadership with the impression of an apparent abandonment by their supposed ally.  
On a societal level, meanwhile, there existed an omnipresent anxiety regarding the 
perceived influence of American culture – what some leftists deemed “Coca-Colonization” – on 
the French way of life throughout the 1950s.
23
 Part of the anti-Americanism stemmed from 
circumstances. While searching for an identity in the shadow of the humiliation wrought by 
World War II, the French were confronted by an influx of products and media from the self-
confident and triumphant US.
24
   Equally, the perceived impact of American business practices 
during reconstruction in the 1950s spawned fiery movements, like the Poujadists, who viewed 
American-style capitalism as incompatible with the French lifestyle.
25
 The installation of 
American military bases and personnel littered throughout France, meanwhile, represented a 
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tangible encroachment by the Americans, adding credence to the many other anxieties regarding 
America‟s negative, if overstated, influence.
26
 
      Challenging the conventions of the US-led NATO alliance offered an effective way 
for de Gaulle to galvanize factions on the left and the right and restore confidence in the 
Republic. These efforts tapped into common resentment found in many outlets regarding 
America‟s economic, cultural, and military influence. De Gaulle‟s insistence on independence 
and freedom of action attracted right-leaning French, like the Gaullist Union pour la nouvelle 
République (UNR) and the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), who believed France 
should have a greater international role. His hints of anti-Americanism appealed to the leftists 




On a more practical level, meanwhile, the Atlantic Alliance suited de Gaulle‟s goals 
because it was within the Alliance where de Gaulle‟s diplomacy could have the most impact. By 
the late 1950s, the geopolitical situation had changed in a way that left Europe poised to play a 
greater role in international affairs. Western Europe had, by then, recovered economically from 
the lingering effects of World War II and had begun an unprecedented streak of tremendous 
economic growth. Meanwhile, with developments in Soviet atomic technology – the launch of 
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Sputnik and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles – the United States faced a 
perceived nuclear parity and could no longer act as sole protector of Western Europe.
28
 These 
factors coalesced to provoke the US to seek further cooperation and integration among Western 
European NATO members as increased Cold War tensions placed “the greatest premium on 
Western unity.”
29
 This, in turn, spelled an increased importance of France within US Cold War 
strategy because, without France, NATO would become “a geographic absurdity,” to quote one 
Newsweek editorial.
30
 As a result, de Gaulle‟s decisions of non-integration and non-compliance 
seemed all the more potent, lending credence to the perception of renewed strength and vigor in 
the Gaullist Fifth Republic.  
The Atlantic Alliance, furthermore, provided the ideal framework for exercising a foreign 
policy meant for domestic consumption. De Gaulle knew he could challenge the NATO alliance 
directly and undermine US conception of Western unity (Western nations aligned under de facto 
US leadership) without jeopardizing French security in any real way. His actions bore no risk of 
escalating hostilities (if not aggravation) from France‟s allies. Indeed, the US‟s greater plans for 
the preservation of peace in Western Europe demanded stability in France, which de Gaulle‟s 
return wrought. The various US diplomatic leaders, many of whom had known de Gaulle and his 
tendencies since World War II, understood that de Gaulle‟s nationalistic inclinations, though 
vexing, were preferable to a collapse of French government or a civil war, the likes of which 
seemed imminent in spring 1958.  
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US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for instance, remarked in a Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations hearing on 14 January 1959 that de Gaulle‟s revival of France was “a very 
important and significant fact.” But, noting that “one hardly gets anything for nothing,” he added 
that, as a result, the US would have “some complications and difficulties” with de Gaulle‟s 
“extreme[ly] nationalistic point of view.”
31
 De Gaulle thus proved able to appease both his 
domestic constituency, through his rejection of American leadership and his insistence on 
national independence, and also France‟s NATO allies through his constant reaffirmation of “the 
deep-seated solidarity which exists among Western powers.”
32
    
   Additionally, de Gaulle knew that he could undermine NATO‟s unity without any 
danger from the Soviet bloc. He understood that the USSR no longer posed any genuine threat to 
Western Europe. Despite excitable rhetoric emanating from both superpowers, de Gaulle 
recognized the Cold War had settled into a stalemate and neither superpower had any inclination 
to undermine the arrangement. He likened the Soviet Union‟s policies in Eastern Europe to 
eighteenth century Russian imperialism and not to an ideologically-driven superpower intent on 
global revolution. Moreover, he questioned how the Soviet Union would set out to conquer the 
economically resurgent and stable Western European nations when, by 1958, it still “had not 
conquered the satellites.”
33
  Equally, Soviet advances in nuclear technology and the resulting 
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perception of parity with the US precluded the threat of nuclear war.
34
  Later events, like Nikita 
Khrushchev‟s scuttling of the May 1960 summit in Paris and the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961, reflected the Soviet Union‟s increasingly defensive stance, which only served to convince 
de Gaulle further of the preservation of the Cold War status quo.
35
 By 1963, de Gaulle was 
convinced that the Soviet Union‟s “time had passed.”
36
 
Given these considerations, it becomes clear why de Gaulle made the NATO alliance the 
centerpiece of his foreign policy of grandeur. He understood that challenging the existing order 
within the alliance offered the greatest opportunities for wide-ranging domestic support without 
risking French security or upsetting the international order. Additionally, French diplomatic 
decisions carried the most influence within the NATO alliance. The consternation and anxiety de 
Gaulle‟s decisions caused his Anglo-American allies served to strengthen Gaullist claims of 
renewal and resurgence under the Fifth Republic. France had much less means elsewhere (like 
the Soviet Union for example) to draw the same ire and, therefore, the same domestic effect. 
With a strategy in place, then, de Gaulle and his diplomatic advisors moved to lay the 
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groundwork for the foreign policy of grandeur that marked his presidency in 1959 and 
thereafter.   
1958: SETTING THE STAGE FOR GRANDEUR 
 In late September 1958, both US President Dwight Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan received a letter and attached memorandum from the new French Premier 
which proposed dramatic changes to the Atlantic Alliance. The memorandum, dated 17 
September 1958, cited the perceived shortcomings of the NATO alliance as seen from France‟s 
own interests. De Gaulle used the events from the summer of 1958, namely the bungled Anglo-
American operation in Lebanon and Communist China‟s shelling of Taiwanese offshore islands, 
as a pretext to support his argument. The scope of the NATO alliance, confined to Europe, was 
sorely inadequate to handle the global nature of Cold War crises. The alliance did not extend to 
cover broad swathes of the globe, including The Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Pacific, all of which, de Gaulle argued, were the “indivisible responsibilities of France.”
37
  
 With the changes brought on by the Cold War, the scope of NATO, de Gaulle concluded, 
needed reconsidering. After drawing this conclusion, he proceeded to propose a reorganization of 
the Alliance which soon became the source of controversy among NATO member states. The 
memorandum stated: 
France cannot consider that NATO, under its present form, satisfies the 
security requirements of the Free World and, particularly, her own. It seems 
to her necessary that at a world-wide political and strategic level, there 
should be instituted an organization comprising the United States, Britain, 
and France. This organization would, on the one hand, take common 
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decisions on political questions dealing with world security and … apply 
strategic action plans, particularly as regards the use of nuclear weapons … 
The French Government considers such an organization of security as 
indispensable. From now on it subordinates to it all development of its 
current participation in NATO and proposes, if it appears necessary to 
arrive at it, to invoke the procedure of the revision of the North Atlantic 
Treaty in conformity with article 12.
38
  
Indeed, what he proposed was nothing short of a triumvirate of power rested in the hands of 
France and the Anglo-Americans. More importantly, any future participation by France in 
NATO, he noted, hinged on this proposal.  
 The September “Memorandum on the Directory,” as it came to be called, spelled, for 
many contemporaries and historians alike, the decisive break with the foreign policy of the 
Fourth Republic and the inauguration of de Gaulle‟s new policy. Certainly, de Gaulle himself 
intentionally helped seed this perception. “As early as September 14, 1958 [erroneously dated],” 
he recalled in his memoirs, “I hoisted my colors,” framed as if to mark the start of a new epoch.
39
 
But, despite de Gaulle‟s efforts to shape the memory of the early Fifth Republic, he could hardly 
charge that the rationale behind his September Memorandum was a break with the policies 
pursued within NATO by the Fourth Republic.  
 As French historian Maurice Vaïsse reminds us, French confidence in NATO‟s system of 
integration had waned greatly prior to the return of de Gaulle, most notably as a result of the 
conclusions drawn from the failed 1956 Anglo-French operation in Suez. Equally, the lack of 
Anglo-American support for French operations in North Africa helped shape French desires for 
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joint leadership and an expansion of NATO‟s scope as early as 1956 under Premier Guy 
Mollet.
40
 Indeed, the leaders of the Fourth Republic were largely disillusioned with the 
functioning of the alliance, something that led them to numerous proposals of their own for 
increased cooperation with their Anglo-American counterparts. As late as May 1958, while the 
Fourth Republic was besieged by the crisis of the army in Algeria, Prime Minister Pierre Pflimlin 
and Foreign Secretary René Pleven proposed heightened cooperation among the three powers on 
the basis of France‟s progress in the nuclear field, similar to the Gaullist proposal of 1958.
41
 De 
Gaulle could therefore hardly claim with authenticity that the Fourth Republic had not made 
strides of its own to alter the NATO alliance. 
 From a strategic standpoint, the September Memorandum was hardly original, echoing 
many Fourth Republic grievances.  The September Memorandum did not mark a genuine shift in 
French strategic reasoning, but it provided the pretext for all Gaullist foreign policy that would 
follow. As de Gaulle noted, France‟s participation within the alliance depended on the changes 
proposed. It seems likely that he did not expect Eisenhower to accede to the vast proposals, 
which not only outlined a vast reorganization of the alliance but also institutionalized the 
triumvirate leadership at the expense of the remaining NATO allies.
42
 When Eisenhower finally 
replied on 20 October 1958, he sympathized with the French position, but confirmed that NATO 
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could not adopt the proposed changes. Eisenhower feared that such reorganization would lend 
the impression to other NATO nations that “basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are 
being made without their participation.”
43
  
 Certainly there is reason to believe the Gaullists expected rejection and that, with this 
denial, they were handed the desired grounds to begin the withdrawal from NATO‟s integration. 
For one, they already knew how the US felt on the matter. During his first encounter with US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Paris on 5 July 1958, de Gaulle broached the subject of 
tripartism. In response, and without hesitation, Dulles firmly elucidated “the dangers of such a 
course,” adding that “nothing of the nature … should be established as a formal institution.”
44
 
One can therefore hardly doubt that the French strategists knew full well what reception the 
memorandum would have in London and Washington. 
So, if not a greater role in NATO, what did the Gaullists hope to gain from the September 
Memorandum? Several years later, in a conversation with his Minister of Information, Alain 
Peyrefitte, de Gaulle explained the reasoning behind the September Memorandum: 
That memorandum was a procedure of diplomatic pressure. I searched, 
then, to find a means of leaving NATO and reclaiming my freedom which 
the Fourth Republic had lost. At the time, I asked for the moon.  I was 
certain that they wouldn‟t grant it to me. The Anglo-Americans would like 
to be able to use their force as they wish … What they want is to dominate 
us. But in not responding to my memorandum, they allowed me to make 
                                                          
 
43
Letter from President Eisenhower to President de Gaulle, 20 October 1958, The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, The Presidency: Keeping the Peace XIX, ed. Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1151-1161.  
44
 Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 
Volume VII Part 1 Western European Integration and Security; Canada, Ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington 
DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 353. (Hereafter abbreviated as FRUS vol. VII Part 1) 
50 
 
some arrangements which led me to move away from NATO, little by little. 
I could not have done it if I hadn‟t first endured that refusal.
45
  
De Gaulle‟s Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville later reaffirmed these sentiments, 
noting that de Gaulle was “under no illusion” regarding the eventuality of the proposal. From a 
practical standpoint as well, there was reason to doubt that the alliance, according to de Gaulle‟s 
specifications, would meet French expectations. As Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary-General of 
NATO, later reflected in his memoirs: “There were … reasons why, in my opinion, the 
triumvirate scheme was not viable. It seemed unlikely that de Gaulle would always be prepared 
to bow, in the conduct of international affairs, to the decisions of his two Anglo-Saxon 
partners.”
46
 Taken together, these reflections illustrate the intent of the September Memorandum. 
Clearly, de Gaulle and his advisors did not expect to emerge from the negotiations with a 
heightened role in the alliance. Instead, it seems, the Gaullists planned to use the Anglo-
American reluctance as an excuse for the bold actions taken in 1959 and beyond.   
Despite his refusal on 20 October 1958, Eisenhower sought not to alienate de Gaulle. Far 
from accepting the far-reaching proposals put forth by de Gaulle, he approved exploratory low 
level diplomatic talks between the three countries. This was, however, too little too late. Even 
before de Gaulle received Eisenhower‟s polite, if blunt, refusal on 20 October, he had already 
reaffirmed his plans for France to have a “national” defense during a meeting with his National 
Defense Council on 13 October.
47
 Noting that his Anglo-American counterparts had “replied 
evasively,” de Gaulle moved to carry out his foreign policy of grandeur, orchestrated with his 
                                                          
45
Alain Peyrefitte, C’était De Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 360.  
 
46
Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966, trans. Henry Fox (Boston, 
MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), 314.  
47
 Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, 21-22. 
51 
 
domestic audience in mind. With the expected response to the memorandum behind him, “there 
was nothing,” he later recalled, “to prevent [France] from taking action.”
48
  The French Premier 
thus looked toward the year of 1959, when he could embark on a series of diplomatic moves 
designed to build upon the Gaullist narrative of renewal and the desire to show the newly 
inaugurated Fifth Republic in full action.    
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CHAPTER 3: DE GAULLE’S FOREIGN POLICY OF GRANDEUR 
 
On 8 January 1959, Charles de Gaulle was sworn in as the first president of the Fifth 
French Republic. His inaugural address highlighted the hardships France had faced in its recent 
past. He also spoke of the opportunities which awaited his country, thanks largely to the new 
institutions afforded it. Later in the month, he proudly announced to his countrymen that “a 
rejuvenated France is once more taking up the reins of history.”
1
 Accompanying these remarks, 
de Gaulle embarked on his foreign policy of grandeur. The intent was simple: demonstrate a 
clear juxtaposition of demeanor and policy between the Fourth and Fifth Republics which 
coincided with the demise of the old and the inauguration of the new.  
Beneath the surface, the continuities between the Fourth and Fifth Republics were 
numerous.
2
 Politically, however, de Gaulle aimed to make this less obvious. The framework of 
the Fifth Republic constitution gave de Gaulle the opportunity to exploit certain arenas, including 
foreign policy which was the President‟s domaine réservé. While his ministers and advisors 
worked toward the same goal elsewhere – André Malraux in the Ministry of Culture and Jacques 
Reuff in the economic sphere, to cite two examples – de Gaulle employed foreign policy in the 
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service of Gaullist myth-making concerning the image of national renewal. He designed the 
foreign policy of grandeur with two goals in mind. The first was to garner support for the Fifth 
Republic by carrying out policies which had broad popular appeal. The second intent was to 
further discredit the Fourth Republic. By declaring the need to reclaim national independence, it 
was implied however subtly, that the Fourth Republic had somehow lost it. And, of course, 
somewhere between the two goals laid the potential for substantiating claims to national unity.  
1959 ACT ONE: THE FRENCH MEDITERRANEAN FLEET 
Following the inauguration, de Gaulle and his advisors quickly proceeded to demonstrate 
France‟s reassertion of independence, first by withdrawing the French Mediterranean Naval Fleet 
from NATO integrated command and later by demanding the removal of US nuclear weapons 
stationed in France. The actions taken in 1959 were certainly limited in practical effect. Despite 
aggravating his Anglo-American counterparts, the decisions did little more than make for 
interesting headlines. Arguably, though, it was this aspect which de Gaulle regarded most 
importantly. How better could the French President contrast the new republic with the old than to 
challenge the existing order in a highly visible way? His decisions, far removed from the staid 
and muted negotiations which often accompanied diplomacy, capably fixed national and 
international attention on the actions of the French President. The consternation his decisions 
elicited from France‟s allies served to reaffirm the ostensibly dramatic shift in French leadership 
de Gaulle had hoped to portray.   
The first significant diplomatic act came on 6 March 1959. In a telegram to the US 
Department of State, the French announced a change to the status of France‟s naval forces in the 
54 
 
Mediterranean whereby France‟s naval forces, in the event of war, would remain under national 
command, contrary to NATO‟s framework of integration. Prior to the withdrawal, a portion of 
France‟s Mediterranean fleet contributed to the integrated Allied Forces Mediterranean 
(AFMED), under the command of a British admiral based in Malta. This subordination to a 
British superior became a source of irritation throughout the 1950s, given France‟s sizable 
presence in the Mediterranean. The frustration was further exacerbated when, in the late 1950s, 
the British reduced a large portion of its NATO naval forces allocated to AFMED, leaving the 




Despite lingering frustrations over the integration of France‟s naval forces, the telegram 
cited France‟s responsibility to defend the French community and protect vital oil supply-lines 
from the Sahara as the main rationale for the decision. The demands placed on the fleet 
stemming from the “struggle to pacify Algeria,” the telegram claimed, also played a role in the 
decision. Throughout, the telegram alluded subtly to the same complaints raised in the 
September Memorandum regarding the scope of the alliance.
4
  
But should one accept the telegram‟s claims at face value? The diplomatic record from 
the period suggests otherwise. For one, the claim that France‟s actions were taken because “the 
zone of possible NATO action does not extend to the south of the Mediterranean,” proved 
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 Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly stated, the scope of the alliance 
covered not only “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,” but also “the 
Algerian Departments of France.”
6
 Moreover in time of peace (and the Cold War had indeed 
established a virtual peace), individual NATO countries were able to use their fleets as they 
deemed fit – the alliance did not prevent this. Consequently, the decision simply “de-earmarked” 
France‟s fleet from potential future wartime use.
7
 
The private correspondence tells a similar story. As early as 23 January 1959, the French 
Ambassador in Washington, Hervé Alphand, informed US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
that de Gaulle felt “the French naval forces should be as free as the US Mediterranean forces, 
notably the Sixth Fleet.”
8
 In the meeting, Alphand made no mention of the Algerian War. 
Instead, what seemed important was the status of France‟s fleet which, unlike the US‟s Sixth 
Fleet, was integrated into NATO‟s Mediterranean command.  In the days leading up to the 
official announcement, the French Ambassador revealed that “this latest move was a reflection of 
the fact that France preferred „cooperation‟ to „integration.‟”
9
 US officials too, in their 
assessment, felt the impending action was simply “a matter of French national pride.”
10
 Their 
analysis, like Alphand‟s earlier analysis, contained no mention of the Algerian War. It seems 
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clear, then, that the desire to display the Fifth Republic‟s newfound policy of independence – not 
the exigencies of the Algerian War – guided the decision on the fleet withdrawal.  
For his part, in his first press conference of the year on 25 March 1959, de Gaulle seized 
the opportunity to publicly castigate the alliance for its perceived shortcomings. France, in 
withdrawing its fleet, he implied, simply restored its rightful place amongst nations. He 
proceeded to remind the audience that Britain and the United States, “the two other great world 
powers of the Atlantic Alliance,” had both withheld the “greater part of their naval forces from 
being integrated into NATO.” France, as he saw it, had no reason to act differently. He made it 
clear that France‟s action on the fleet was not anomalous; the withdrawal marked the start of a 
new era. When a reporter asked if France would take a similar stance on its ground and air 
forces, de Gaulle responded coyly “Well, you will see what happens.”
11
    
It is clear, then, that the new administration of the Fifth Republic had more in mind then 
those cited in the 6 March telegram. Nothing within the NATO context directly constrained 
France from fulfilling the stated needs while also willfully complying with NATO integration. 
Instead, the decision played directly into their new, larger domestic aim of portraying a unified 
and rejuvenated France. The move fit nicely into the larger constructed Gaullist narrative of 
France reclaiming its independence, and with it its voice, after the failings of the Third and 
Fourth Republics. The action left opposing domestic political forces with little to muster dissent, 
thus strengthening de Gaulle‟s claims to embodying national unity.  
                                                          
11
 “First Press Conference Held by General de Gaulle as President of the French Republic in Paris at the 
Elysée Palace on March 25, 1959” in Major Addresses, 49-50. 
57 
 
Fittingly, the administration‟s decision became the centerpiece of French national 
newspapers barely a week after the pronouncement weaved its way through NATO‟s diplomatic 
channels. Both Le Monde and Le Figaro, for instance, devoted several pages, including the 
centerpiece of the front page, to analysis of the decision.
12
 The newspapers offered an array of 
coverage and commentaries on the decision. Often, without expressly endorsing the 
government‟s position, the articles framed the NATO system of integration in a manner which 
lent credence to the President‟s complaints. French commentators, it seemed, sympathized with 
the Gaullist skepticism regarding institutionalized subordination within the alliance.  
As Le Figaro wrote, “We note, for our part, that the French initiative is likely to open 
new prospects for solving the questions of cooperation posed officially by General de Gaulle last 
September. Many will be pleased about it. Others will regret that the moment chosen [for 
withdrawal] wasn‟t made with a perfect sense of timing [given the outbreak of tensions over 
Berlin].”
13
 Far from critical, the article recognized that the move had widespread appeal.  
The decision struck a chord with the writers of Le Monde too. One article from the March 
15-16 edition noted that “the hierarchy of the Atlantic [Alliance] placed all commands, at all 
levels, under the orders of an American leader.” “Our naval forces,” he added, “find ourselves in 
the same situation to those of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, reduced to responsibility of a 
subordinate sector.”
14
 The article confirmed de Gaulle‟s claim that the alliance not only rested 
power in American hands, but also subordinated France in a fashion akin to three tangential 
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NATO members. It also unwittingly revealed anxieties about France‟s perceived decline. De 
Gaulle‟s position thus struck a chord with a public who, regardless of political stripe, did not see 
France, with a history of influence and empire, in the same light as countries like Greece and 
Italy. Moreover, the move fooled nobody: the article noted that, to some, the initiative was seen 
“much less for immediate needs than by the desire of the Fifth Republic to assume all the 
responsibilities related to its role as a great power.”
15
  As the article suggested, the French public 
recognized de Gaulle‟s efforts and responded favorably to the nationalist elements of his 
policies.   
Not to be forgotten, outside observers also noted of the action. As one New York Times 
article keenly observed, the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet “was probably as 
popular with the French public, currently in the throes of a marked nationalist syndrome, as it 
was unpopular and worrisome to France‟s fourteen allies in NATO. Not a single important voice 
was raised publicly against the action. And, to the average Frenchman, the news probably 
sounded like a brass band chorus of „La Marseillaise.‟”
16
 It was clear that de Gaulle‟s decision 
had garnered national and international attention, projected an image of France that largely 
matched his rhetoric of national rejuvenation, and quieted potential domestic dissent. By 
fashioning a foreign policy which had widespread domestic appeal, de Gaulle and his advisors 
brought together factions of society (like the PCF) which would have otherwise opposed his 
ventures. 
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1959 ACT TWO: THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN NUCLEAR STOCKPILES   
Within months, de Gaulle took a stand against the storage of foreign nuclear stockpiles in 
France. The events associated with the decision were drawn out over a series of months and 
therefore lacked the media potency of the pronouncement on the French Fleet. It was nonetheless 
much aligned with not only the Gaullists‟ broader narrative but also public opinion. The debate 
concerned the storage of nine US F100 bomber squadrons located in France. In light of the 
escalating Berlin crisis, General Lauris Norstad, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander of 
Europe, deemed it necessary to equip the nine squadrons stationed in France with nuclear 
warheads.
17
  This line of reasoning, for all its strategic merit, was at odds with the Gaullist view 
that France and France alone should possess control over nuclear stockpiles in France.    
In analyzing the decision, one must see the process of withdrawing the nuclear stockpiles 
and accompanying bomber squadrons within the broader context of France‟s pursuit of an 
independent nuclear strike force. Unfortunately, the complexities associated with this matter, 
worthy of an examination of their own, are beyond the limits of this study. At the simplest, the 
French nuclear program had its origins in the Fourth Republic. By the time of de Gaulle‟s return, 
the leaders of the Fourth Republic scheduled the first test of a French bomb for early 1960. The 
leaders of the Fourth Republic pursued a nuclear weapons program for a number of reasons. De 
Gaulle, meanwhile, saw the force de frappe, as it was called, as primarily a political tool; it was 
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Once the dust had settled regarding the French Mediterranean fleet, de Gaulle acted on 
his objection to NATO nuclear stockpiles on French soil. In a letter to Eisenhower on 25 May 
1959, de Gaulle noted France‟s concerns. The letter alluded to many of the irreconcilable 
concerns raised in his September Memorandum from the previous year, namely the lack of a 
joint tripartite leadership and NATO‟s limited scope. De Gaulle also tied the US‟ resistance to 
France‟s pursuit of an atomic weapon to his decision. As he stated:  
[France] obviously cannot entirely entrust her life or death to any other state 
whatsoever, even the most friendly. For this reason, France feels it is 
essential that she participate, if the case were to arise, in any decision which 
might be taken by her allies to use atomic missiles … Until she has been 
able to conclude with the United States and with Great Britain the 
agreements which seem necessary to her on this subject, she cannot consent 
to such projectiles being stored on her territory and used from there unless 
she herself has complete and permanent control over them. As I have … 
[written] to you previously, I believe that these problems might be solved 
between us as soon as there has been established between the United States 
and Great Britain and France organized cooperation in political matters and 
in strategic matters for the security of the world.
19
 
De Gaulle justified the decision by placing the onus on the United States to do one of two things: 
either accede to his previous call for tripartite leadership and nuclear cooperation or accept his 
decision to further France‟s aims for independence.  
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 Certainly, there is reason to believe, as some scholars have argued,
20
  that the ultimatum 
was sincere in its attempt to facilitate the creation of a French bomb. Regardless, the decision 
served the aim argued here. The leadership of the Fifth Republic‟s broader goal was to create an 
atmosphere of nationalistic self-respect within France that contrasted his foreign policy, and 
therefore the Fifth Republic, with the image of a prostrate France under the Fourth Republic 
acquiescing to American dictates. After all, the issue in question was France‟s apparent 
subordination institutionalized through NATO‟s system of integration. Therefore, if the 
Americans had accepted his requests, an obvious longshot to say the least, he would have 
enhanced French prestige and facilitated the creation of a French nuclear weapon without 
committing France to any integration. Or, if the Americans responded evasively to his requests 
and instead withdrew the weapons in question, he could claim a diplomatic victory.
21
  
 Norstad and others consequently opted for the latter option, thereby handing de Gaulle 
his second tangible foreign policy success in a matter of several months. By early June, a sizable 
portion of the air forces had moved to West Germany. The entire redeployment, which took 
about six months, quietly shifted the nine air squadrons and their accompanying nuclear 
warheads to bases in West Germany and the United Kingdom.
22
 All told, de Gaulle‟s decision 
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bore no adverse strategic consequences for the alliance, though Norstad fumed about France‟s 
perceived obstinacy when “the vote is against them by 14 to 1” within the alliance.
23
  
Domestically, in light of the frustrations concerning the presence of foreign military 
personnel and weapons, the decision to remove foreign nuclear stockpiles was quite popular. 
Leftists in the country rejected the pervasive influence America presented while the voices of the 
far right, ardent defenders of French colonialism, disdained the installation of American military 
bases throughout France, an ostensible colonization of its own. Beyond the anti-Americanism 
presented by the political margins remained the broad swathe of the general public who 
maintained a distinct inclination for neutralism and non-alignment within the context of the Cold 
War.
24
  With this in mind, an overwhelming 69% of citizens polled responded that they approved 
of de Gaulle‟s decision on foreign nuclear stockpiles, compared to only 4% who disapproved 
(27% had no answer).
25
 To the majority of the French, the presence of foreign nuclear stockpiles 
seemed more like an unwarranted provocation than an added security measure.     
 The decision to demand the removal of foreign nuclear stockpiles from France served the 
Gaullists‟ goal to substantiate the narrative crafted by the architects of the early Fifth Republic – 
Debré like Malraux – regarding the return of political independence (and therefore grandeur) 
from prior subordination. Later in the year, on 3 November 1959, as the last of the US bombers 
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were departing French soil, de Gaulle gave an impassioned and nationalistic speech to the cadets 
of the Saint-Cyr Military Academy about the need for French independence. He said in part: 
The defense of France must be French. This is a need that has not always 
been very familiar during the last few years, I know, but it must return to 
such. If war comes to pass for a nation like France, so be it. Its effort must 
be its effort. If it was otherwise, our nation would contradict everything it 
has stood for since its founding, with its role, with the respect it has for 
itself, with its soul. Naturally, French defense would be, should the case 
arise, joined with that of other nations. This is only natural. But it is 
essential that this defense be our own, that France is defended by itself, for 




The speech acknowledged, with a touch of remorse, the dependence France had repeatedly had 
on outside powers in recent decades, from the failures of the Third and Fourth Republics to the 
abhorrence of the Vichy regime and even the shortcomings of the Free French movement and its 
reliance on the allied forces.  But he also implied that now, given his return, France would pursue 
its own defense policy, in an effort to discredit the previous regime. What he failed to mention, 
of course, was that, under the Fourth Republic, numerous technological advances were made 
which cleared the way for the creation of a French bomb. Indeed, without these gains, France 
would not have been able to test its first bomb as quickly as it did. Though de Gaulle touted the 
first test, on 13 February 1960, as one of the many successes of the newfound Fifth Republic, it 
was in fact Prime Minister Félix Gaillard, in April 1958, who ordered the successful detonation 
of a French bomb by early 1960.
27
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Despite the continuities between policies, de Gaulle was able to project a sharp departure 
from the defunct Fourth Republic through a highly visible and authoritative manner. Whereas the 
many leaders of the Fourth Republic relied on negotiation and compromise to alter their position 
in NATO, de Gaulle simply announced his decisions, leaving little room for compromise. 
Through this use of cult of personality, augmented by an effective manipulation of press 
conferences and speeches, de Gaulle was able to create the impression of a renaissance of French 
independence under the Fifth Republic.
28
  
Also, despite the limited strategic impact of his decisions on the French Mediterranean 
Fleet and foreign nuclear stockpiles, the French President was successful in shaping popular 
perception of a strengthened and emboldened France. His announcements – not negotiations – on 
the Mediterranean Fleet and the foreign nuclear stockpiles provided the opportunity “to 
demonstrate that the Fifth Republic had its own policies.”
29
 As early as April 1959, already 55% 
of the French citizenry believed France had gained international prestige in the year since the de 
Gaulle‟s return, compared to only 8% who felt the opposite.
30
After demonstrating France‟s 
seemingly newfound independence in 1959, de Gaulle used the first half of 1960 to reinforce the 
presidential image as embodiment of the new French Republic in a series of highly publicized 
state visits to the United States and the United Kingdom.   
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1960: THE GRAND STATESMAN 
    Aside from illustrating France‟s seemingly renewed stature through a foreign policy of 
non-integration, the French President relied greatly on state visits and summit diplomacy in the 
early years of his presidency to substantiate his message of national renewal. Though highly 
important, this aspect of de Gaulle‟s foreign policy, his usage of state visits to convey a sense of 
grandeur, is rarely mentioned in the historiography. Their conspicuous absence from the 
literature on Gaullist diplomacy may stem from the fact that de Gaulle‟s state visits generally did 
little to advance negotiations or alter policies regarding NATO.    
Perhaps as a result, no study of Gaullist foreign policy has placed his state visits in the 
context of his foreign policy of grandeur. This is a predicament not limited to de Gaulle‟s 
foreign policy; in general, as Jeffrey G. Giauque noted, “the theoretical literature on summitry, as 
opposed to analyses of specific meetings, is quite sparse.”
31
 Despite their absence from the 
secondary literature, the role of summit diplomacy and state visits was central to de Gaulle‟s 
foreign policy of grandeur. Indeed, de Gaulle himself attached great importance to state visits. 
As he recollected in his memoirs: 
The respectful attention shown us on all sides persuaded me to increase our 
contacts with the outside world. This led to an active interchange of visits, 
all of them occasions for mutual exchanges of view if not always mutual 
persuasion, for the furtherance of relations, for the conclusion of agreements 
… and for the manifestation of public sentiment. I attached the highest 
importance to them, knowing what reverberations such encounters often 
produce. True, they no longer have the same dramatic character as of old, 
and the facilities of modern travel have deprived them of some of their 
glamour. Nevertheless, during these years when France was resuming her 
rightful place in the world, the visits to Paris of so many foreign rulers and 
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statesman, and my own journeys … formed the weft and woof and the 
visible illustration of our global recovery.
32
 
He saw state visits as vital, not for the advancement of negotiations, but for their ability to 
muster public enthusiasm and shape opinion. The role of state visits offered him a chance to act 
as the personification of France abroad.  
 The French President saw visits of foreign Heads of State and his own travels as grand 
opportunities to further French prestige and ensure his own legitimacy. In this effort, one is 
reminded of the Third Republic‟s employment of republican symbolism in song, ceremony, and 
statuary in its effort to “arouse and orient public opinion,” to quote Philip Nord.
33
 In a similar 
sense, in an age of television and radio, de Gaulle used his monarchical persona and nationalistic 
rhetoric in the service of shaping popular perception of the French President and the Fifth 
Republic by capturing the attention of newspapers and television stations. With this in mind, de 
Gaulle always went to great lengths to ensure the visits were accompanied by magnificent 
ceremonies of pomp and circumstance.
34
 Likewise, his visits to foreign countries almost always 
ensured spectacle.     
 This section therefore focuses on de Gaulle‟s own visits to the United Kingdom and the 
United States in April 1960. The visits were significant, as this was de Gaulle‟s only official state 
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visit to the US during his presidency and his first official visit to London since his days as leader 
of the Free French during the Second World War. Also, and perhaps not unrelated, his string of 
visits came on the heels of the detonations of France‟s first and second nuclear bombs, in 
February and April respectively, at a time when French prestige, in the eyes of the three other 
nuclear-armed states, was at its height.
35
    
The French President‟s first official state visit, a four-day tour de force of ceremonies, 
speeches, processions, and banquets, began on 5 April 1960 in the United Kingdom. Shortly after 
noon, de Gaulle and his wife arrived by train to London‟s Victoria Station, greeted by a concert 
of state officials, including the Queen and Prime Minster, and a sizable assemblage of exuberant 
onlookers.
36
  After cordial exchanges, the official party exited the station and climbed into a 
series of open-faced carriages, the first of which was reserved for de Gaulle and the Queen. The 
carriages – six in all – led a procession from Victoria Station to Buckingham Palace, the entire 
route lined by enthusiastic crowds.
37
  Upon reaching their destination, the official party found the 
Palace surrounded by 100,000 densely-packed Englishmen chanting “Vive de Gaulle.”
38
 Later 
that evening, after a royal banquet honoring the guests, a lavish fireworks display entertained the 
French President and the Royal family, perched on a Palace balcony, as well as the “unbroken 
sea of upturned faces” still congregating in the surrounding area.
39
 The crowd of 100,000 persons 
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which had gathered around Buckingham Palace and overflowed into St. James Park to witness de 
Gaulle‟s entrance was, reportedly, the largest gathering at the Palace since the V - E Day 
celebration in May 1945.
40
   
The following day de Gaulle, speaking before both Houses of Parliament, provided an 
impassioned and lengthy speech which drew upon the shared memories of the Second World 
War, denounced the dangerous and aberrant Cold War, and reaffirmed Anglo-French solidarity. 
In typical Gaullist fashion, the entire speech was committed to memory, much to the amazement 
of his audience. This feat, accompanied by de Gaulle‟s commanding presence, “combined to 
heighten the sense of occasion,” ensuring that none “could be unaware of the surge of emotion 
that passed through Westminster Hall and which found expression in sustained handclapping.”
41
  
During the state visit to Britain, de Gaulle capitalized on his legacy as wartime leader of 
the Free French to reinforce his claims to presidential legitimacy. Throughout the trip he made 
subtle and overt references to his former role. While at Westminster, for instance, he devoted 
approximately one-third of his speech to the triumphs and sacrifices of the Second World War. 
The following day, de Gaulle was the centerpiece of a gathering of several hundred people held 
at Carlton Gardens, de Gaulle‟s wartime headquarters, meant to commemorate the wartime 
movement. Additionally, a highlight from the fireworks display of his first evening in London 
was a pair of fireworks shaped like the Cross of Lorraine, the Free French symbol. These cues 
provided, for all involved, a constant reminder of de Gaulle‟s ostensible authority and stature. 
Reinforcing the connection further, de Gaulle spent the majority of the trip donning a spare, 
                                                          
40
Drew Middleton, “De Gaulle gets London Welcome: 100,000 at Palace Acclaim War Leader on His 
Return,” New York Times, April 6, 1960. 
41
“General De Gaulle Calls to Abandon Nuclear Arms,” The Times, April 8, 1960.   
69 
 
khaki military uniform, much more befitting a war hero than the President of the French 
Republic. In highlighting his wartime attributes, de Gaulle hoped to establish a degree of 
continuity between the perceived heroics of his wartime past and the early Fifth Republic, 
thereby disassociating France from the memories of the Fourth Republic.  Likewise, these 
actions forced the masses to link him to a mythologized and undisputed past, with all its positive 
attributes, and not to the negative connotations of a modern politician.  
Despite lingering disputes regarding NATO and Britain‟s proposals for a European Free 
Trade Area, it was clear from the outset that de Gaulle would use his time in London to conjure 
public sentiment, not advance negotiations.  Indeed, after a 45 minute tête-à-tête with Harold 
Macmillan on the first day of his visit, “there was no indication” that the French President “had 
been impressed” with the British Prime Minister‟s proposals.
42
  The only tangible agreement 
scored after two meetings during the trip was a joint reaffirmation of solidarity in the face of the 
upcoming East-West summit in May 1960.   
His characteristic obstinacy, however, did nothing to prevent his larger goal of shaping 
public opinion; indeed the general public responded strongly to the French President. As Life 
magazine would describe it, “through an alchemy of personality and sentiment, [de Gaulle] won 
a diplomatic triumph without settling one of the many political and economic differences 
worrying the two countries.”
43
 Following his departure, the left-leaning British periodical The 
New Statesman reflected on the President‟s visit: 
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The warmth of the reception which London has accorded President de 
Gaulle is in genuine contrast to the perfunctory cheers which normally 
accompany state visits. This is due in part to the general recognition that de 
Gaulle, whatever his shortcomings, is a man of quite extraordinary stamp; 
for the public, in an age of mediocrities, can still instinctively respond to 
greatness. It is also due to the memories, which Londoners still preserve, of 
the somber days of 1940 … Today, the British public, though highly critical 
of France, recognizes that its old ally has two faces, and is prepared to give 
de Gaulle the benefit of the doubt and concede that he represents the one 
which we admire and respect.
44
   
The combination of genuine sentiment demonstrated by the masses and de Gaulle‟s self-
conscious employment of a paternal and stately public persona helped construct the intended 
image of national rejuvenation and resurgence.   
Later in the month, de Gaulle made stops in several major cities during his eight-day tour 
of the United States. The state visit, lasting longer and stretching thinner than de Gaulle‟s time in 
London, lacked the intensity of its predecessor. Nonetheless, de Gaulle did not fail to impress.  
He received full city honors when he and Madame de Gaulle arrived in New York City on 26 
April, 1960. The couple was treated to an exuberant ticker-tape parade down Broadway en route 
to City Hall.
45
 After his whirlwind 22-hour tour of New York, of which over a million New 
Yorkers came out to see, de Gaulle and his official entourage headed west. When he arrived in 
San Francisco the following day, he was met by 250,000 people and treated once again to a 
ticker-tape and confetti parade, as the procession ambled through tricolor-laden avenues. The 
reception “was regarded by the police as the biggest ever given [in San Francisco] to a head of 
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 The official trip continued with visits to Washington D.C. and New Orleans, where the 
heralded guest received similar treatment before de Gaulle departed for the French Caribbean.  
During his visit to Washington, de Gaulle spent ample time privately with President 
Eisenhower in the White House and on Eisenhower‟s Gettysburg farm. The two talks between 
the men, similar to the de Gaulle-Macmillan talks earlier in the month, reaffirmed their solidarity 
in light of the upcoming summit but settled little more beyond it. On a political level, de Gaulle 
capably conveyed the image of a restored France under his stewardship.  After his departure, 
newspapers and periodicals praised the French President for his apparent revival of France as a 
stable and reliable ally. Life magazine, for instance, noted that “his reception represented a high 
moment of personal and historic triumph,” citing “de Gaulle himself” as the greatest factor for 
“the return of French prestige.”
47
 Newsweek, in a piece on de Gaulle‟s trip, lavished the French 
President with even further praise: 
As General Charles de Gaulle stepped from his plane into the brilliant 
sunshine … one could sense the feeling of pride in the man … In 22 
months, by sheer force of his character, he completely had recast the 
world‟s image of France. No longer did the world look upon France as a 
third-rate power, incapable of governing itself and more a problem for the 
West than a viable asset. Now France again indubitably was a great power. 
De Gaulle had come to Washington, at the oft-repeated invitation of 
President Eisenhower, as a full-fledged partner of the U.S. and Britain in 
planning the West‟s position for the summit conference.
48
  
By all accounts, it seems, de Gaulle had effectively woven for his hosts a new image of the 
French Republic based on his perceived steadfast leadership.   
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 But how did the French regard their president‟s state visits abroad? They followed his 
every step closely from France. Each day, from 5 April to 10 April, Le Figaro made his state 
visit to Britain the headline story, which suggests a genuine preoccupation. The accompanying 
pictures alone were revealing. The photos evoked grandeur and pride, the President always, and 
without fail, depicted as stately and regal. On 5 April 1960, for instance, the front page photo 
depicted the Tricolor waving majestically alongside the Union Jack with the clock tower of the 
British Parliament providing the backdrop.
49
 Several pages later, a picture depicted a small boy, 
alongside a policeman, gazing in awe as mounted guards prepared for their guest‟s arrival.
50
 
Both images conveyed simple messages of reverence and admiration.  In the following days, the 
pictures of de Gaulle showed him in commanding poses, from saluting a crowd,
51
 to speaking 
before parliament and inspecting royal guards.
52
 All conveyed, day after day, a sense of authority 
and monarchical statesmanship. Photography does, admittedly, play an abstract role in shaping 
public perception. There is no doubt, however, that the steady barrage for nearly a week, which 
depicted French grandeur personified in the President, helped reinforce messages of renewed 
national unity and prestige.  
The words were no less flattering. Le Monde wrote on the day of de Gaulle‟s London 
arrival, “President de Gaulle … is assured in advance of a most enthusiastic welcome. Even 
among those, notably the Labour Party and the Liberals, who the politics of grandeur irritates, it 
is held in high esteem. It inspires respect.”
53
 Le Monde also made a special point to include 
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doting reviews from the British press, including the Daily Mirror and the Guardian.
54
 All of 
these measures helped portray de Gaulle as a man of exceptional qualities. Both the foreign 
press, of which was translated into French in the leading newspapers, and the papers‟ own 
reporters offered lavish praise.   
  Ultimately, the foreign policy initiatives taken by the administration in the early years of 
the Fifth Republic effectively shaped the perception of national renewal.  It is a testament to de 
Gaulle‟s theatrics that the limits of French power were largely concealed during the period. From 
a strategic standpoint, de Gaulle‟s challenges had virtually no impact on the functionality of the 
alliance. Consider the French Mediterranean Fleet for instance: only about one-third of France‟s 
naval tonnage in the Mediterranean actually was integrated into NATO.  The other two-thirds 
had always remained under national command, since NATO‟s inception, and was never 
integrated.
55
 The move was, in reality, completely ineffectual. Yet de Gaulle‟s NATO allies, like 
Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak, still fretted the “incalculable psychological significance.”
56
 
The nature of Gaullist foreign policy during the period ensured broad popular support, as 
he did not affront his NATO allies but instead simply resisted integration. Moreover, de Gaulle 
was always quick to affirm France‟s fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance (the concert of Western 
nations), even if he rejected the integrationist model of NATO. In all, his decisions were 
generally supported by the French public, who maintained skepticism about the usefulness of 
NATO, let alone France‟s meager position in it. The manner in which he approached state visits 
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also contributed to a heightened perception of renewal and change in the young Gaullist Fifth 






The period from spring 1958 to spring 1960 marked the return of Gaullism as a potent 
political force. During that time the French Republic saw the end of the Fourth Republic, barely 
twelve years old, and the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, one which provided the president 
with unprecedented powers. The main goal of de Gaulle, Michel Debré, and others, of course, 
was the creation of a state which allowed for one paternal figure to rise above the divisive 
elements of modern politics and promote a particular vision of national unity. This came in the 
form of Charles de Gaulle, who, supported by his Gaullist companions, shaped a narrative of 
renewal and unity in the early Fifth Republic.  
Employing nationalism, through rhetoric and a tangible policies (including foreign 
policy), the Gaullists sought to legitimate the Fifth Republic and its “Republican Monarch.” The 
legitimacy they craved came in the form of popular support, or at least muted dissention. The 
Gaullists sought to vindicate their constitutional reforms by crafting a persuasive argument that 
the Fifth Republic had rectified France‟s course (both domestically and internationally) after the 
perceived failures of prior republics. In this effort, the Gaullists consistently vilified the 
parliamentary nature of the Fourth Republic, arguing that the system institutionalized the 
divisions within French society. In contrast, the Gaullists hoped to portray the “Republican 
Monarch,” in further evidence of fundamental change between republics, as the embodiment of 
French unity.   
76 
 
To serve this end, de Gaulle and company orchestrated a foreign policy that lent the 
perception of positive change and also presidential authority. By carrying out diplomatic 
initiatives that had popular appeal and responded to widespread French social and political 
anxieties, de Gaulle managed to substantiate his claims of national unity and legitimacy. The 
copious press coverage that accompanied all of de Gaulle‟s actions, alongside his resolute and 
stately persona, made the decisions seem very potent.  His decisions were generally supported by 
the French public, who maintained skepticism about the usefulness of NATO, let alone France‟s 
meager position in it. The manner in which he approached state visits also contributed to a 
heightened perception of renewal and change in the young Gaullist Fifth Republic. The way de 
Gaulle framed the policy decisions – that France deserved independence and prestige, if not 
influence – proved difficult for leftist opponents to craft compelling counterarguments, at least in 
the early years.     
A GAULLIST SUCCESS? 
How, then, do we measure if the Gaullists‟ efforts succeeded? Certainly, I have already 
identified how each of the relevant foreign policy decisions received some degree of popular 
support from the French public. But this only reveals one aspect of the larger goal. As I stated 
throughout, the broader goal of the Gaullists was to effectively convince the French public that 
the early Fifth Republic served to rejuvenate France and unify the French people under the 
leadership of Charles de Gaulle. In this effort, foreign policy provided one aspect. The real 
measurement of Gaullist success was the extent to which the public bought into the narrative of 
renewal and unity.  
77 
 
In this respect, the Gaullists did prove successful. Their first goal was to mythologize the 
person of General de Gaulle and, from there, make him synonymous with the Fifth Republic. 
The national myth of Charles de Gaulle became a central piece of the constitutional revisions, 
which aimed to institutionalize what Stanley Hoffman has termed “heroic leadership,”
1
 
envisioned by Debré and others. As Debré wrote later: 
Most certainly, this constitution, in the minds of those who conceived and 
wrote it, and I myself was foremost among them, did allow General de 
Gaulle to assume responsibility for French affairs for the longest period of 
years possible. How could we have considered doing otherwise when in 
every respect our domestic state of affairs, the needs of Europe, and the 
exigencies of the world scene called for a kind of government that only 




De Gaulle provided for the Gaullists the galvanizing force with which to represent the perception 
of profound governmental change following the inauguration of the Fifth Republic.  
For the Gaullists, Charles de Gaulle represented the Man of 18 June – the mythologized 
(and romanticized) lone resister in June 1940 and the undisputable personification of the French 
nation thereafter. This myth was constructed and shaped largely by the writings of the Gaullist 
intellectual Raymond Aron in the 1950s and accepted by a French public unwilling to turn a 
critical, introspective eye onto the wartime years under the Vichy regime.
3 
De Gaulle, too, 
mythologized his own role in his massively popular Memoires de Guerre, published in the mid-
to-late 1950s. Conveniently, and perhaps not coincidentally, the final volume of de Gaulle‟s war 
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memoirs was released in 1959 under the title Le Salut (Salvation). Fittingly, the last volume 
recounted de Gaulle‟s triumphs in saving France and restoring the French state following Nazi 
occupation (seen, of course, through a fuzzy and nostalgic lens).
4
 The theme of salvation proved 
timely during the first year of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle‟s presidency. 
Additionally, in Gaullist lore, de Gaulle‟s ostensibly apolitical role, for them, meant that 
he could embody the nation in its entirety (unlike the supposedly partisan politicians emblematic 
of prior French republicanism). André Malraux, the writer and Minister of Culture under de 
Gaulle, revealed this thought in 1969 in a conversation with de Gaulle: “For the majority those 
who followed you, it does not seem to me that your ideology was the major element. The 
important thing was something else: during the war, obviously, it was the national will; 
afterward, and especially since 1958, it was the feeling that your motives, good or bad, were not 
the motives of the politicians.”
5
 The early Fifth Republic, then, rested on the legacy of de Gaulle. 
The Gaullists made him the central representation of the perceived shift from the Fourth 
Republic to the Fifth.  
 In this multi-faceted myth-making of de Gaulle, the public responded positively. His 
perceived aura of national legitimacy did much to ensure confidence and support for the regime. 
As one Frenchwomen wrote in November 1958, “Most of us are hopeful but worried. Maybe 
that‟s what we are worried about – being hopeful, I mean. Here in France we‟ve lost the habit for 
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 Fittingly, the women‟s thoughts echoed both aspects of the Gaullist narrative: that de 
Gaulle had revived France and that the Fourth Republic (and earlier) had consistently failed the 
French people.  Additionally, de Gaulle‟s constant denunciations of a Fourth Republic “totally 
unfit to ensure the conduct of affairs” helped shape public perception.
7
 In August 1958, for 
instance, 75% of the French public agreed that “the parliamentary system was bad.”
8
 In contrast, 
60% of the public expressed satisfaction in de Gaulle‟s government. Their greatest reasons for 




 Electoral success for Gaullist and other conservative parties sympathetic to the Gaullist 
cause in 1958, and later in 1962, helped sustain the perception of change under de Gaulle‟s 
leadership. In the elections of 1958, for instance, the Gaullists gained 216 of 481 seats in 
parliament. Together, with other right-leaning parties, the conservatives parties gained 388 of 
481 possible parliamentary seats.
10
 The overwhelming successes of conservative and Gaullist 
parties in parliament helped authenticate de Gaulle‟s claims to national unity. 
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 We shouldn‟t forget, however, that the Gaullists had their opponents during the period. In 
the vote for de Gaulle‟s investiture on 1 June 1958, for instance, 244 deputies voted “no,” many 
of whom came from the socialist or communist ranks and proved skeptical to cede power to a 
strong man in a manner all too reminiscent of the investiture of Marshal Pétain in 1940.
11
 
Throughout the de Gaulle presidency, there were leftists and, increasingly, figures on the far-
right who denounced de Gaulle and his allies. Thanks to Gaullist efforts to include leaders of the 
major parties in the constitutional drafting process, many parties found themselves forced to 
reluctantly accede to the Gaullist Fifth Republic. On the far-right, meanwhile, partisans became 
disillusioned with de Gaulle‟s position on French Algeria. But their voices were capably 
marginalized. In numerous instances the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), in efforts to 
preserve French Algeria, organized uprisings and assassination attempts against the de Gaulle 
government – acts not dissimilar from the one that toppled the Fourth Republic in May 1958.
12
 
De Gaulle countered by denouncing the “guilty ones” and reiterating his mandate granted by the 
French people and the “national legitimacy” he had “embodied for twenty years.”
13
 The de 
Gaulle government proved able to silence or marginalize, in the early years, the rancorous 
factions that challenged its narrative of national unity.   
In all, the diplomatic decisions chosen for study in this thesis presented just one of many 
elements which contributed to the Gaullist narrative of change and renewal. In this respect, the 
foreign policy cases helped shape public perception but were not, of course, the central factor. 
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One should not overlook the main element which ensured public support for the regime in this 
early period. The public had invested in Charles de Gaulle to solve the seemingly unsolvable 
quagmire in Algeria. Everything else, including international affairs, was ancillary to this 
pressing concern. The public proved willing to go along with the prescribed governmental 
changes mainly because of the mandate they had given de Gaulle in regards to the Algerian War.  
As the war ran its course, though, the Gaullists relied on various policies to sustain the 
feeling of hope and confidence which pervaded during the period of de Gaulle‟s investiture. De 
Gaulle attached the greatest importance to this effort: “The important thing – perhaps the most 
important thing for all men who have been involved with history – was not what I said, but the 




Public support, though not during the early period covered in this thesis, did eventually 
wane. Though beyond the scope of this thesis, the events of May 1968 represent the most 
obvious example of the eventual repudiation of de Gaulle and the Gaullist narrative he 
maintained. In foreign policy too, as de Gaulle took on an increasingly confrontational stance in 
the later years of the administration – most notably in the outright withdrawal from integrated 
command in 1966 from NATO – public support wavered.
15
 Even during the period studied here, 
the notions of national unity the Gaullists evoked were, in many ways, illusions. The consistent 
electoral majorities and the public‟s trust in de Gaulle to end the Algerian War aided the 
Gaullists in their efforts to paper over the divisions in French society that did still exist. Though 
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the Gaullists, in their goals outlined in this thesis, proved successful till 1960, a larger study 
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